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KILLING  THEM  WITH  KINDNESS:  EXAMINING
“CONSUMER-FRIENDLY”  ARBITRATION




In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court struck Califor-
nia’s so-called “Discover Bank rule”—a judge-made rule providing that
arbitration agreements attended by class action waivers are unenforce-
able if those agreements are contained in standard form consumer
contracts.1  The Discover Bank rule had been informed by a judicial
suspicion that class waivers in adhesion contracts often prevent puta-
tive claimants from being able to vindicate their rights.  But over time,
the rule was applied more broadly and ceased to be limited to cases
where the ability to vindicate rights was frustrated.  The fact that the
Discover Bank rule might save many claimants from forfeiting the abil-
ity to vindicate their rights—from seeing their claims “slip through
the legal system”—presented no justification, in the view of the Scalia-
led majority, for a prophylactic state rule that would label “uncon-
scionable” all arbitration agreements in standard-form consumer con-
tracts.  Even if such an ex ante rule were “desirable for unrelated
reasons,” the Court held, “States cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA.”2
 2012 Myriam Gilles.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  Jeffrey Bergman
provided valuable research assistance.  Special thanks to Christopher Drahozal and
Gary Friedman, who gave me tremendously helpful comments and input on
substance and method.
1 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1748 (2011), abrogat-
ing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
2 Id. at 1753.
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As I and others have argued, Concepcion leaves open and
unresolved the viability of a state law challenge to a bilateral arbitra-
tion clause which is shown, in a particular case, to impose a forfeiture
of the claimant’s ability to vindicate his state law rights.3  Reasonable
people can dispute the implications that Concepcion holds for such
challenges, whether they are couched in terms of a generally applica-
ble state law doctrine against exculpatory contracts,4 or the vaguer
and broader concept of “unconscionability.”  But the Concepion major-
ity certainly did not foreclose such challenges in any explicit fashion—
indeed, the Concepcion Court expressly granted certiorari to consider
whether states may condition the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement on the availability of class-wide procedures “when those
procedures are not necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitra-
tion agreement are able to vindicate their claims.”5
Meanwhile, in the context of federal claims, the Second Circuit in
Amex III6 reaffirmed, in light of Concepcion, its earlier holdings that a
class action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement is unen-
forceable if it is proven in the individual case that the arbitration
clause at issue would force the claimant to shoulder such costs as
would prevent the claimant from effectively vindicating its federal stat-
utory rights.7  On both the state and federal levels, then, cost-based
vindication of rights challenges remain a significant concern to corpo-
rate defendants looking to exculpate themselves from exposure to
aggregate litigation.
All of this begs a question: will the robust recognition of cost-
based, evidence-backed vindication of rights challenges swallow up the
basic ruling of Concepcion, rendering unenforceable arbitration agree-
ments and class action waivers that the Supreme Court has held are
otherwise to be enforced?
3 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) (discussing potential state
law cases after Concepcion).
4 See, e.g., Picardi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 251 P.3d 723, 725 (Nev. 2011)
(noting plaintiffs’ argument that “the class action waiver was exculpatory because, in
cases . . . where the individualized claims are relatively small, it is almost impossible to
secure legal representation unless those claims are aggregated with the claims of
other similarly situated individuals”).
5 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 6617833 (emphasis added).  In their petition,
moreover, the Petitioners expressly distinguished Amex as “based on federal law, not
state law,” and as involving a “finding that the respondents could not vindicate their
antitrust claims on an individual basis.” Id. at 16 n.7.
6 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
7 Id. at 206. Amex’s unique procedural history is recounted infra, Part I.B.
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Recently, in Amex IV,8 a divided Second Circuit refused to rehear
Amex III en banc.  In dissenting from the court’s decision, Chief Judge
Jacobs flagged this very issue, complaining that the vindication of
rights doctrine “can be used to challenge virtually every consumer
arbitration agreement that contains a class action waiver”9 given the
generally low per-plaintiff damages and significant expense of litigat-
ing most federal class actions.10  Such an expansive interpretation
would, in Chief Judge Jacobs’s view, imply that class action waivers in
cases asserting rights arising under most federal statutes are per se
unenforceable, “permit[ting] plaintiffs to evade enforcement of class
action . . . waivers simply by manufacturing an affidavit or choosing
pricey attorneys.”11  In the end, “every class counsel and every class
representative who suffers small damages [could] avoid arbitration by
hiring a consultant (of which there is no shortage) to opine that
expert costs would outweigh a plaintiff’s individual loss.”12
As this article goses to print, the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari to review the Amex case.13  Nonetheless, Chief Judge Jacobs’s
instrumentalist admonition that the vindication-of-rights “exception”
will swallow the Concepcion “rule” is a useful launching-off point:  I see
three basic responses, to each of which I have applied labels that I will
use throughout this article.  First, a “liberal pragmatist” would say to
Chief Judge Jacobs, “So what?  If an arbitration agreement prevents
the vindication of rights, it should fall.  It makes no difference if the
vindication of rights exception applies to save 5% of class filings or
90%.” (That said, one’s view on whether 5% or 90% is more likely will
turn on how one treats attorneys’ fees and other recoupable cost
items, as discussed below in Part II).  What matters to the liberal prag-
matist is whether claimants are deterred from vindicating their rights.
8 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex IV), 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012).
9 Id. at 143 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting); see also Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048–49 (“If the Concepcion majority had intended to allow for
the plaintiffs to avoid class-action waivers by offering evidence about particular costs
of proof they would face—essentially applying the underlying rationale of Discover
Bank without relying on Discover Bank as a ‘rule’—one would expect it to have drawn
attention to such a significant point in response to the dissent.”).
10 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2005)
(noting that the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals’ fees, and other disbursements
in nearly any “complex commercial case, will exceed the value of the recovery [the
claimant] is seeking”).
11 Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 142 (Pooler, J, concurring); see also id. at 143 (Jacobs, C.J.,
dissenting) (reflecting Chief Judge Jacobs’ view that the vindication-of-rights excep-
tion will swallow the Concepcion rule).
12 Id. at 144.
13 American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012).
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A second response, which I will call “practical formalism,” would
observe that the vindication of rights exception is narrower than
meets the eye.  Following Concepcion, bilateral arbitration clauses
themselves are evolving to permit vindication of rights, by providing
that companies will absorb otherwise non-recoupable costs and fees,
and by posting “bounties,” premiums and other features discussed
below in Part II.A.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion has ushered in a
sort of “race to the top”—a development that should be cheered. The
correct legal approach is a case-by-case evidentiary test as to whether
the particular clause permits vindication in the particular case.
A third response, which I will call “FAA absolutism,” holds that
there is no vindication of rights exception.  Even where the enforce-
ment of a bilateral arbitration clause can be shown to exculpate the
defendant from wrongdoing or prevent the effective vindication of
rights in a particular case, the clause is per se enforceable under the
FAA.  On this view, it is no defense to an arbitration clause that it
snuffs out substantive claims.  The FAA saving clause recognizes only
defenses to the making of an arbitration agreement; any defense relat-
ing to the ability to vindicate rights is, on this view, a non-cognizable
public policy-rooted defense.
And then, of course, there is the “conservative instrumentalist”
approach that drives Judge Jacobs’s dissent.  This view (as I see it)
does not dispute the basic rule that arbitration agreements are
enforceable only so long as they permit the effective vindication of
federal rights.  But this instrumentalism is driven by the concern a
vindication “exception” will swallow the Concepcion “rule.”
The “liberal pragmatist” view is exemplified by my own prior writ-
ings and the First Circuit’s decision in Kristian v. Comcast, which
focused on the real world effects that class action waivers have on law-
yers and litigants.14  The “FAA absolutist” view finds its most perfect
expression, I think, in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Concep-
cion, which is quite explicit in its bases for rejecting the vindication of
rights doctrine.15
But the view that I perceive as becoming dominant in the post-
Concepcion world is “practical formalism,” under which most claimants
seeking to make the vindication of rights showing are likely to fail, as
consumer-friendly arbitration clauses proliferate across the corporate
14 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Gilles, supra
note 10 (exemplifying the “liberal pragmatist” view).
15 AT&T Mobility v. LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“As I would read it, the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate
be enforced unless a party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration
agreement, such as by proving fraud or duress.”).
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landscape.16  Justice Scalia in Concepcion offered up the observation
that the claimants in that case could have vindicated their rights under
the bilateral arbitration clause at issue, principally because “the arbi-
tration agreement provides that AT & T will pay claimants a minimum
of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they obtain an arbitration
award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.”17  Since that time,
numerous lower courts have rejected challenges to arbitration clauses
and class action waivers based upon the observation that the clause at
issue would in fact allow the vindication of rights—at least, when mea-
sured against the yardstick of Concepcion.18
The goal of this Article is to provide a snapshot of this particular
moment in the development of federal arbitration jurisprudence,
focusing on cost-based challenges to the explicit or implicit anti-aggre-
gation feature of arbitration provisions in the post-Concepcion era.
Part I charts the doctrinal bases for these challenges, which are cast in
terms of either vindication-of-rights or substantive unconscionability.
Part II seeks to verify my hunch that corporate transactional attorneys
have taken a cue from the case law, developing bilateral arbitration
agreements that appear designed to give judges comfort that the
claimant will be able to vindicate its rights, thereby enabling courts to
enforce those agreements as written, in conformity with the FAA.
Here, I examine thirty-seven current arbitration clauses, confirming
that many large and well-known consumer-oriented companies have
over time incorporated “friendly” provisions to their arbitration
clauses, such as offering to pay filing fees, providing for attorney and
expert fee-shifting, and promising “bounty” or premium payments to
claimants who achieve a better outcome in arbitration than the com-
pany’s last-best offer.  This Part, in particular, is in freeze-frame, as I
expect that companies will continue to make modifications to their
arbitration clauses in response to litigation outcomes.  Finally, Part III
discusses the four basic post-Concepcion approaches to cost-based chal-
lenges: FAA absolutism, practical formalism, liberal pragmatism and
conservative instrumentalism.  As courts around the country take
stock of consumer friendly arbitration clauses to determine the extent
16 See, e.g., American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, Respondents’ Brief in
Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 2 (noting “the ongoing evolution of
arbitration agreements, which increasingly include pro-claimant features designed to
facilitate the effective vindication of complex statutory claims”) (on file with the
author).
17 Id. at 1753.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 47–62 (discussing post-Concepcion cases find-
ing plaintiffs have failed to carry their evidentiary burden of showing the inability to
vindicate rights under pro-consumer arbitration clauses).
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to which they permit the effective vindication of rights, it is hard to
deny that practical formalism has become the dominant strain in the
law.
I. COST-BASED CHALLENGES TO INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION
IN THE WAKE OF CONCEPCION
Cost-based challenges assert that class action waivers embedded
in an arbitration clause prohibit spreading financial outlays across
multiple claimants in collective litigation, effectively precluding the
individual plaintiff from being able to vindicate her federal statutory
rights (under Amex) or her state common law or statutory rights
(under post-Concepcion case law).  Specifically, the waiver prevents
multiple plaintiffs from sharing the “the costs of experts, depositions,
neutrals’ fees, and other disbursements . . . forc[ing] the individual
claimant to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to deter the
bringing of claims.”19  And these costs, in any complex federal or state
claim, will always exceed the value of the recovery the claimant is seek-
ing.  When arbitration “proves too costly to pursue,” courts become
amenable to hearing challenges rooted in cost-prohibitiveness.20
A. Vindication of Federal Statutory Claims
Up until the 1980s, there was substantial uncertainty regarding
the applicability of the FAA to federal statutory claims.21  In 1984, Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., made clear that the
FAA does apply to such claims so long as the arbitration procedure at
issue in the particular case allows for the effective vindication of fed-
eral statutory rights.22  There, an American manufacturer alleging
Sherman Act violations against a Japanese supplier sought to avoid an
arbitration clause, arguing it not be forced into international arbitra-
19 Gilles, supra note 10, at 407 (citation omitted) (“In the absence of the waiver,
the claimant may spread these costs across thousands of coventurers (or have them
advanced by lawyers, as happens in practice). In the presence of the waiver, these
costs fall on her alone.”).
20 Amalia D. Kessler, Op.-Ed., Stuck in Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/opinion/stuck-in-arbitration.html.
21 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (finding claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 fully arbi-
trable); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . The Arbitration Act established that, as a mat-
ter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”).
22 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL206.txt unknown Seq: 7 12-FEB-13 15:56
2012] examining “consumer  friendly”  arbitration  clauses 831
tion because, it assumed, an international arbitrator would apply the
law so as to deny plaintiff its rights under American antitrust claims.23
The Supreme Court rejected this blanket assumption, explaining that
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statu-
tory cause of action . . . the [FAA] will continue to serve both its reme-
dial and deterrent function.”24  But the Court also warned that if
plaintiff’s fears were realized and the arbitrator construed the under-
lying agreement or applicable law in a way that “operated . . . as a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for
antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy.”25
Mitsubishi was followed six years later by Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp., where the Court upheld an employment contract
requiring plaintiff to arbitrate his claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act.26 Gilmer dealt with one issue only: a broadside
allegation that Congress did not intend to authorize arbitration of
ADEA claims.  In support of his allegation, plaintiff pointed to indicia
including the (alleged) unavailability of class procedures and equita-
ble relief in arbitration.  But the Gilmer case itself was not a class
action,27 and the plaintiff did not claim that arbitration actually pre-
cluded his ability to vindicate his rights under the ADEA.  Rejecting
plaintiff’s argument, the Court held that a clear statement of Congres-
sional intent is required to establish that claims under a federal statute
are categorically inarbitrable.28
Finally, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the Court consid-
ered a consumer’s argument that an arbitration agreement was unen-
forceable where the cost of arbitration would leave her unable to
effectively vindicate her claims under the federal Truth in Lending
Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act.29  Recognizing the viability of
23 Id. at 624–25.
24 Id. at 637.
25 Id. at 637 n.19 (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory reme-
dies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agree-
ment as against public policy.”); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995) (quoting Mitsubishi and making clear the Court
would have stricken the challenged arbitration clause if the plaintiff had succeeded in
showing the arbitral forum and choice of law clauses served to prevent it from vindi-
cating its rights).
26 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
27 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
28 Id.  at 29.
29 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 83 (2000). The specific ques-
tion granted review was “whether an arbitration agreement that does not mention
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plaintiff’s argument under Mitsubishi, the Court held: “It may well be
that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a liti-
gant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the
arbitral forum.”30  The Court then established a simple case-by-case
framework for determining challenges to arbitration agreements
based upon a prohibitive costs/vindication of rights rationale, the
Court held: “where . . . a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agree-
ment on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive,
that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood if incurring
such costs.”31
From Mitsubishi, Gilmer, and Green Tree sprang numerous lower
court decisions considering the vindication-of-statutory-rights defense
to arbitration clauses containing class action waivers.32  Lower courts
have been uniform in their recognition of the Green Tree test.  As then-
Circuit Judge John Roberts held, a party may “resist[ ] arbitration on
the ground that the terms of an arbitration agreement interfere with
the effective vindication of statutory rights,” but that party “bears the
burden of showing the likelihood of such interference,” which “can-
not be carried by ‘mere speculation.’”33  More often than not, in
arbitration costs and fees is unenforceable because it fails to affirmatively protect a
party from potentially steep arbitration costs.” Id. at 82.
30 Id. at 90.  In Green Tree, the Court found that the consumer had not carried her
burden to prove the costs of arbitration were prohibitive. Id. at 90–91 (“[T]he record
does not show that [the consumer in this case] will bear such costs if she goes to
arbitration. . . . The ‘risk’ that [the consumer] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is
too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”).
31 Id. at 92.  More recently, in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273
(2009), the Court recognized that arbitration agreements may not prevent claimants
“from effectively vindicating their federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”
32 For the most part, lower federal courts have understood these cases to rest on
the supposition that the arbitral forum adequately protects litigants’ ability to resolve
their statutory claims.  But “[t]his supposition[ ] falls apart . . . if the terms of an
arbitration agreement actually prevent an individual from effectively vindicating his
or her statutory rights.”  Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230,
1234 (10th Cir. 1999); see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273 (2009)
(“[A] substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld . . . .”);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (“[B]y agreeing to arbi-
trate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”
(quoting Gilmer., 500 U.S. at 26) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
33 Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also
Spinetti v Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that a party
seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement due to prohibitive expense bears the
burden of proving that likelihood); Musnick v. King Motor Co of Fort Lauderdale,
325 F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding also that a party seeking to invali-
date an arbitration agreement due to prohibitive expense bears the burden of prov-
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applying the Green Tree test, lower courts have found that the plaintiff
has failed to provide sufficient proof of prohibitive costs.34
B. Amex  I–IV
Over the years, a number of courts have had occasion to consider
the Green Tree test in the context of a challenge to a class action
waiver,35 where plaintiffs allege that the inability to bring a claim col-
ing); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc, 238 F.3d 549, 556–57 (4th Cir.
2001) (holding also that a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement due to
prohibitive expense bears the burden of proving); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912
A.2d 104, 112–13 (N.J. 2006) (holding also that a party seeking to invalidate an arbi-
tration agreement due to prohibitive expense bears the burden of proving).
34 See, e.g., Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 780 (10th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Green Tree’s discussion of the burden to demonstrate prohibitive costs and
explaining that the plaintiffs had not met their burden); Cicle v. Chase Bank USA,
583 F.3d 549, 556–57 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing the Green Tree standard but holding that
the record did not support a finding of economically prohibitive costs); Mazera v.
Varsity Ford Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 565 F.3d 997, 1003 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that,
to determine whether a cost-splitting provision in an arbitration agreement is enforce-
able, courts must conduct “a case-by-case inquiry into whether the potential costs of
arbitration are great enough to deter potential litigants and similarly situated individ-
uals from seeking to vindicate their federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum”
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig.,
505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that a party that can “demonstrate that the
prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration prohibitively expensive”
and invalidate the agreement, but that plaintiffs failed to do so); James v. McDonald’s
Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that it was unclear whether Green
Tree, which applied to federal statutory claims, extended to common-law or state-law
claims, but that even if it did, the party opposing arbitration had not shown that “that
the expenses she necessarily and definitely would incur would make arbitration pro-
hibitive”); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Tell-
ingly, [plaintiffs’] only ‘evidence’ of prohibitive arbitration costs is an unsubstantiated
and vague assertion that discovery in an unrelated arbitration matter disclosed fees of
nearly $2,000 per day.”); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir.
2002) (“[Plaintiff] does not even provide any evidence about the most basic element
of this challenge: the size of the allegedly ‘prohibitive’ arbitration fee itself.”);
Bonanno v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., LLC, No. 06-cv-02358-CMA-KLM, 2009 WL
1068744, at *15 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009) (enforcing contract clause barring class
actions where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate they would incur excessively high costs
in proceeding individually); Ornelas v. Sonic-Denver T, Inc., No. 06-cv-00253-PSF-
MJW, 2007 WL 274738, at *6 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2007) (refusing to strike class arbitra-
tion waiver because the evidence did not demonstrate the costs of pursuing arbitra-
tion would effectively “preclude the plaintiff from pursuing his claims”).
35 See, e.g., Cotton Yarn,.50 F.3d at 285 (“[W]e have acknowledged that if a party
could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration
prohibitively expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement. . . .”); Dale v.
Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Kristian v. Comcast
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lectively thwarts the vindication of rights.  The primary case in this
connection is In re American Express Merchants Litigation.  In Amex, class
action plaintiffs alleging a complex antitrust violation submitted
undisputed evidence that the median pre-trebling value of each plain-
tiff’s claim was $1,751, while the non-recoupable costs required to vin-
dicate each such claim was at least several hundred thousand
dollars.36  Under American Express’s arbitration clause, with its
embedded class action waiver, plaintiffs argued that they could not
“effectively . . . vindicate [their] statutory cause of action in the arbi-
tral forum.”37
Finding that American Express had presented “no serious chal-
lenge” to the plaintiffs’ cost-based evidence, the Second Circuit in
Amex I found that the merchants had carried their burden of proving
that the arbitration agreement’s class action waiver, “by removing
plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery,” effectively
“grant[ed] Amex de facto immunity from [federal] antitrust liabil-
ity.”38  In striking down the arbitration clause, the court stressed the
significant outlay of expert fees—estimated at over $1 million39—and
the fact that such fees are not recoupable by successful litigants under
the cost-shifting provisions applicable in either court or arbitration.40
The same panel (minus Judge Sotomayor, since elevated to the
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54, 58, 61 1st Cir. 2006); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54 (noting that
expert and attorney’s fees dwarf each putative class member’s expected recovery).
36 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300, 317 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing the expert report of economist Dr. Gary French, who concluded that “it
would not be worthwhile for an individual plaintiff . . . to pursue individual arbitra-
tion or litigation where the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic study and
services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1
million”).
37 Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
38 Id at 320. See id. at 315 (“[W]hen ‘a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration
agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party
bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.’” (quoting Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000))); see also infra notes 155–157 and
accompanying text (discussing the closely related concepts of vindication of rights
and exculpatory contracts as twin defenses to contract enforcement).
39 Amex I, 554 F.3d at 316 (quoting Dr. Gary French, plaintiffs’ economic expert,
as stating that “due to the complexity and analytic intensity of an antitrust study, total
expert fees and expenses usually are substantial . . . .  [A] larger study can easily
exceed $1 million.”).
40 Id. at 318 (noting that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees
paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the limit of [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1821(b) . . .” which sets expert fees at forty dollars per diem (quoting Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987)) (internal quotations
omitted)).
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Supreme Court) reiterated this view two years later in Amex II,41 writ-
ing that “the record evidence before us establishes, as a matter of law,
that the cost of plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their dispute with
Amex would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statu-
tory protections of the antitrust laws.”42
On February 1, 2012, the Second Circuit issued its third opinion
in the case, finding Concepcion’s preemption analysis inapplicable to a
challenge that the arbitration provision prevented the effective vindi-
cation of federal claims.43  In the words of Judge Pooler, concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc in Amex IV, the “analysis in Amex III
rests squarely on a vindication of statutory rights analysis—an issue
untouched in Concepcion.”44  And finally, on May 29, 2012, the defen-
dant’s motion for en banc review was denied by a sharply divided Sec-
41 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2011).
After Amex I was decided, the Supreme Court decided Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds
Int’l Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), holding that where an arbitration clause is silent on
the availability of class arbitration, the agreement cannot be construed to provide for
aggregate procedures. Id. at 1773–75.  The Court then granted certiorari in Amex I,
vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the Second Circuit for further
consideration in light of the Stolt-Nielsen decision.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest, 130 S. Ct 2401 (2010) (memorandum opinion).
42 Amex II, 634 F.3d at 197–98.  Specifically, the court held that Stolt-Nielsen did
not require a different result:  “Stolt-Nielsen states that parties cannot be forced to
engage in a class arbitration absent a contractual agreement to do so.  It does not
follow, as Amex urges, that a contractual clause barring class arbitration is per se
enforceable.” Id. at 193.  Rather, the issue in Amex I was “whether the class action
waiver is enforceable when it would effectively strip plaintiffs of their ability to prose-
cute alleged antitrust violations.” Id. at 194.
43 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).  The
Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion was issued shortly after Amex II was published,
but before the mandate issued.  The Second Circuit panel therefore held the man-
date and sua sponte solicited briefing on the impact of Concepcion before issuing its
third opinion.
44 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex IV), 681 F.3d 139, 139 (2d Cir. 2012).
In addition, in Amex III the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether the
Supreme Court’s decision in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) had
any application to the Amex I and II. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 213 n.5.  In CompuCredit,
the Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement could be enforced in a case
involving claims under the federal Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), because
the CROA is silent on whether arbitration is permissible. Id.  The Second Circuit
found that proof of Congressional intent need not be explicit:
Although the Sherman Act does not provide plaintiffs with an express right
to bring their claims as a class in court, forcing plaintiffs to bring their claims
individually here would make it impossible to enforce their rights under the
Sherman Act and thus conflict with congressional purposes manifested in
the provision of a private right of action in the statute.
Id.
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ond Circuit.45  On July 30, 2012, American Express filed a petition for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and in November
2012, the Court granted review.46
C. Lower Court Treatment Of Cost-Based Challenges
Many challenges to arbitration agreements following Concepcion
have come to focus on the imposition of allegedly prohibitive costs.47
Whether those challenges are couched in terms of an Amex/Green Tree
type of argument, or in terms of substantive unconscionability law,48
45 Amex IV, 681 F.2d 139.  Note that while the Second Circuit is the only Circuit to
have directly addressed this issue after Concepcion, other Circuits previously had per-
mitted plaintiffs to challenge class action waivers as cost-prohibitive. See, e.g., Dale v.
Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding arbitration agree-
ments unenforceable in a putative class action under federal Cable Communications
Policy Act); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f
a party could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make
arbitration prohibitively expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement.”
(citing Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2002))); Kristian v.
Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that an arbitration agree-
ment which placed significant limitations on treble damages, attorney’s fees and costs,
and aggregate procedures otherwise available under federal law “would prevent the
vindication of statutory rights” and thus could not be enforced in an antitrust action
against cable company under state and federal law); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,
317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding “that potential litigants must be
given an opportunity, prior to arbitration on the merits, to demonstrate that the
potential costs of arbitration are great enough to deter them and similarly situated
individuals from seeking to vindicate their federal statutory rights in the arbitral
forum”).
46 American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012).  Argu-
ments are scheduled for Feb. 27, 2013, just as this article goes to print.
47 See, e.g., Gordon v. Branch Banking and Trust, 419 F. App’x 920, 926 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding class action waiver unconscionable under Georgia law because of a
lack of a contractual fee-shifting feature), vacated and remanded 132 S. Ct. 577; Anto-
nelli v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 5:11–cv–03874 EJD, 2012 WL 525538, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2012) (finding substantive unconscionability where plaintiff-employees face
greater costs by undergoing compelled arbitration than by litigating); Samaniego v.
Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499–500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“The Agree-
ment also requires plaintiffs to pay any attorneys’ fees incurred by Empire, but
imposes no reciprocal obligation on Empire.  Again, such a clause contributes to a
finding of unconscionability.”).
48 The Supreme Court left the door ajar for unconscionability analysis in
Concepcion:
Of course States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns that
attend contracts of adhesion—for example, requiring class-action-waiver
provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be highlighted.  Such steps
cannot, however, conflict with the FAA or frustrate its purpose to ensure that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.
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most trial courts have found that the claimant’s asserted costs do not
in fact prevent the effective vindication of rights, for a variety of rea-
sons.  Some courts have carefully weighed the putative expense
imposed by the arbitration clause against the claimed damages.  For
example, in Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., plaintiffs alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) challenged an arbitration clause in
their employment contracts, asserting that the inability to pursue col-
lective litigation would effectively prevent them from pursuing their
claims under the statute.49  Judge Sweet computed the plaintiffs’
claimed damages over the relevant statutory period and found them
significant enough that it would be “neither lunacy nor fanaticism for
either plaintiff, or her counsel, to pursue her claim individually.”50
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 n.6. (2011); see also Marmet
Health Care Center v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012) (reversing a state court’s
public policy-based rationale for striking down arbitration clauses in nursing home
agreements as the type of “categorical rule” prohibited by Concepcion, but remanded
the case for consideration of whether the arbitration clauses at issue are nonetheless
“unenforceable under state common law principles that are not specific to arbitration
and pre-empted by the FAA”).  Since then, a number of courts have recognized that
the unconscionability defense remains available. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Keybank, 673
F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Concepcion did not overthrow the common law con-
tract defense of unconscionability whenever an arbitration agreement is involved.”);
In re DirectTV Early Cancellation Fee Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d
1060, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“As Concepcion made clear, the savings clause of the FAA
still ‘permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability . . . .’” (quoting AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011))); Hamby v. Power Toyota Irvine,
798 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1165 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that the decision in Concep-
cion “does not stand for the proposition that a party can never oppose arbitration on
the ground that the arbitration clause is unconscionable”).
49 827 F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  Note also that employees cannot release
their substantive rights under the FLSA by private agreement. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank
v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (“No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of
statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the Act.”); see also
Bormann v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 401 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[P]rivate
waiver of claims under the [FLSA] has been precluded by . . . Supreme Court deci-
sions . . . .”).
50 Raniere, 827 F. Supp. at 317.  Specifically, Judge Sweet estimated plaintiff Bod-
den’s potential recovery at somewhere between $84,875–$350,000 and plaintiff
Raniere’s damages at $149,750 or $617,500, each potentially doubled, as well as
increased, by state the limitations period depending on the method used to calculate
damages. Id. at 315–16; see also Coiro v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 11–3597, 2012
WL 628514, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012) (“After considering the evidence presented
to it, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff has met her burden in demonstrating
that enforcement of the class-action waiver would effectively preclude any action seek-
ing to vindicate proposed class members’ legal rights.”); Emilio v. Sprint Spectrum
L.P., No. 11 Civ. 3041(BSJ), 2012 WL 917535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2012) (“Peti-
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The court applied an objective standard, rejecting as “beside the
point” plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration that “he would be unwilling to
take these cases on an individual basis.”51
Other courts have relied upon the availability of a statutory fee-
or cost-shifting provision as evidence that plaintiff is fully capable of
vindicating her rights because any financial outlays will be recouped
upon success.  In LaVoice v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., for example, a
plaintiff asserting a vindication-of-rights challenge presented evidence
that the damages sought on his FLSA claim totaled about $130,000,
while the costs of individually arbitrating this claim would likely be
2–3 times higher.52  But because the FLSA awards the prevailing party
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,53 the court rejected the vindica-
tion-of-rights challenge and asserted that the plaintiff could easily
arbitrate his claim under the statute and seek to hold the defendant
accountable.54  In another FLSA case, D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp.,
the question before the court was “whether it is economically feasible
for Plaintiffs to proceed in individual arbitrations, rather than a col-
lective or class action in federal court . . . .”55  In answering this ques-
tion, the court focused solely on cost- and fee-shifting: where “each
Plaintiff’s potential recovery is at least $20,000—including double
damages under the FLSA—plus costs and attorney fees,” the plaintiff
tioner has not demonstrated that any of his statutory rights would be precluded
through the Court’s enforcement of the class action preclusion provision . . . .”).
51 Raniere, 827 F.Supp. at 317 n.18.
52 LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2308(BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 124590,
at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012).  Specifically, the court found the arbitration agree-
ments at issue permitted plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees if successful, and that esti-
mated expert costs were speculative because plaintiff conceded he might not employ
an expert. Id.  The LaVoice court ultimately found the evidence of costs “too specula-
tive to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.” Id. at *8 (citing Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000)).
53 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“The court in such action shall . . . allow a reasona-
ble attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”).
54 Lavoice, 2012 WL at *7 (“‘[T]he practical effect of enforcement of the waiver’
. . . would not ‘preclude’ LaVoice from exercising his rights . . . .” (citing Amex II, 634
F.3d 187, 199 (2nd Cir. 2011))); see also Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 2012
WL 1242318, at *2 (W.D. Wisc. Mar. 16, 2012) (“[P]laintiff says that she cannot afford
the cost of arbitration, which she estimates at $14,000.  Although she acknowledges
that the arbitration agreement allows her to recover these expenses if she prevails, she
says she cannot take that risk. Even if I assume that a fee shifting provision might not
provide adequate protection in some circumstances, plaintiff’s argument founders
because she failed to conduct any comparison of the costs of litigating in federal
court.”).
55 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 342 (D. Conn. 2011).
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cannot show that arbitration is cost-prohibitive.56  A number of courts
have similarly interpreted the statutory fee-shifting provided in the
FLSA to undercut any vindication-of-rights challenge.57  And other
courts have applied similar interpretations to uphold arbitration
clauses in numerous contexts in this post-Concepcion, post-Amex
period.58
56 Id. at 343 (emphasis in original).
57 See, e.g., Winn v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., No. 2:10–cv–02140–JPM–cgc, 2011
WL 294407, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2011) (rejecting vindication-of-rights defense
where arbitration provided for “all of the remedies available under the FLSA, includ-
ing the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party,” and making clear that
“[p]laintiff is not prevented from obtaining competent legal representation nor dis-
incentivized from pursuing her FLSA claims”).
58 See, e.g., Gordon v. Branch Banking and Trust, 419 F. App’x 920, 926 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding class action waiver unconscionable under Georgia law because of a
lack of a contractual fee-shifting feature); Antonelli v. Finish Line, Inc., No.
5:11–cv–03874 EJD, 2012 WL 525538, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012) (“The Ninth
Circuit has held that an arbitration cost provision which places complaining employ-
ees at risk of incurring greater costs than they would bear if they were to litigate their
claims in court is substantively unconscionable.  Such is the problem here.” (internal
citation omitted)); Khan v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. C 10–02156 SBA, 2011 WL
4853365, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) (holding that where plaintiff is “seeking to
establish that it is too costly for him to pursue consumer protection claims on an
individual as opposed to a class basis, the Court notes that post-Concepcion decisions
have rejected the cost of litigation as a basis for invalidating a class action waiver”);
Tory v. First Premier Bank, No. 10 C 7326, 2011 WL 4478437, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26,
2011) (“Concepcion moots any argument on the cost benefits to the plaintiff of a class
action versus an individual arbitration.”); Black v. JP Morgan Chase, Civil Action No.
10-848, 2011 WL 3940236, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2011) (finding that plaintiff’s
“ability to recover attorneys’ fees under the Sherman Act ‘help[s] to preserve an indi-
vidual’s ability to pursue claims, even in those situations where the class forum has
been foreclosed’” and that “where, as in this case, the claim involves an alleged viola-
tion of federal antitrust laws, the ability to recover treble damages increases the value
of the claim, thus making it more attractive and one that is likely to be pursued on an
individual basis” (internal citations omitted)); Saincome v. Truly Nolen of Am., Inc.,
No. 11–CV–825–JM (BGS), 2011 WL 3420604, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011)
(explaining FLSA “permits class members to participate in the suit on an opt-in basis
only, eliminating what appears to be the Concepcion Court’s primary concern about
the arbitrator’s ability to properly oversee a class arbitration”); In re Apple and AT&T
iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., No. C–10–02553 RMW, 2011 WL 2886407, at *3
(N.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (“Plaintiffs contention that their modest claims ‘simply do
not provide sufficient motivation for an aggrieved customer to seek redress’ on an
individual basis is the very argument that was struck down in Concepcion.” (internal
citation omitted)); Arellano v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10–05663 WHA, 2011 WL
1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (finding that Concepcion forecloses argument
that an arbitration agreement is void because small claims might be prohibitively
expensive to pursue on an individual basis).
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Other post-Concepcion courts, typified by the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Coneff v. AT&T Corp.,59 have rejected plaintiffs’ assertions that
the class action waiver embedded in the arbitration clause removes
the incentive to bring statutory claims.60  To these courts, the question
of incentive is beside the point: for consumers with small-value claims,
“the concern is not so much that customers have no effective means to
vindicate their rights, but rather that customers have insufficient
incentive to do so.”61  Where, as in Coneff, the consumer friendly fea-
tures of the arbitration clause ensures that the claimant could vindi-
cate its rights, the issue is closed.  It should be noted that the Coneff
court took issue with the decision in Amex III.62
Still other courts, by contrast, have found that plaintiffs have met
their burden of showing cost-prohibitiveness.  In Sutherland v. Ernst &
Young LLP, for example, plaintiff asserting nonpayment of overtime
charges argued that the class action waiver in her employment con-
tract would prevent her from maintaining a viable statutory claim.63
Because plaintiff could only expect to recover $3,800, for which she
would need to spend over $200,000,64 Judge Kimba Wood found she
had “‘substantial[ly] demonstrate[ed]’ that an inability to prosecute
her claims on a class basis ‘would be tantamount to an inability to
assert [her] claims at all.’”65  Most recently, in In re Electronic Books
59 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012).
60 Id. at 1158–59 (“We do not read Concepcion to be inconsistent with Green Tree
and similar cases.  Although Plaintiffs argue that the claims at issue in this case cannot
be vindicated effectively because they are worth much less than the cost of litigating
them, the Concepcion majority rejected that premise.” (footnote omitted)).
61 Id. at 1159 (noting that this was the point made by Justice Breyer in dissent in
Concepcion as the primary policy rationale for class actions).
62 The Coneff Court stated that “to the extent the Second Circuit’s opinion is not
distinguishable, we disagree with it . . . .” Id. at 1159 n.3 (citing Amex III, 667 F.3d
204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012).  The panel based its “disagreement” on its reading of an
Eleventh Circuit case, Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). Id. at
1160.  But the Cruz Court specifically found that it “need not reach the question of
whether Concepcion leaves open the possibility that in some cases, an arbitration agree-
ment may be invalidated on public policy grounds where it effectively prevents the
claimant from vindicating her statutory causes of action.” Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1215.
Despite this footnote, the Coneff panel expressly recognized the vindication-of-rights
theory and further held that the theory survives Concepcion.
63 768 F.Supp.2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
64 Id. at 551–52.  Specifically, plaintiff presented evidence that the cost of arbitra-
tion would exceed $6,000, that plaintiff’s attorney’s fees would exceed $160,000, and
that plaintiff’s expert witness fees would likely exceed $33,500.
65 Id. at 553 (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d 300, 302–303 (2d Cir. 2009).  Judge Wood
also noted that, even if the plaintiff were somehow willing and able to pay $200,000 to
recover a few thousand dollars, she could never get a lawyer to take her case, as no
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Antitrust Litig., plaintiffs’ uncontested evidence in support of their vin-
dication-of-rights challenge included:
[D]etailed affidavits demonstrating that, given the complexities of
proving this particular antitrust violation, plaintiffs can expect at
most a median recovery of $540 in treble damages, and face several
hundred thousand dollars to millions of dollars in expert expenses
alone.  Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that they are likely to incur
significant expenses in securing, organizing, and maintaining docu-
ments, deposing witnesses, and in attorneys’ fees, and that they face
no guarantee of recovering any or all of these expenses.  Plaintiffs
have already expended $45,000 in expert expenses evaluating the
claims and drafting the complaint.  Plaintiffs’ affidavits demonstrate
that it would be economically irrational for any plaintiff to pursue
his or her claims through an individual arbitration.66
This cost-based evidence was sufficient for the district court to
find the arbitration agreements invalid, “because the plaintiffs have
established that the agreements would prevent them from effectively
vindicating their rights under the Sherman Act.”67
Another line of post-Concepcion cases have applied state uncon-
scionability principles to attack arbitration clauses on cost-prohibitive-
ness grounds.  For example, in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC,
the arbitration provision contained an appeals clause requiring the
party requesting a new hearing to “be responsible for the filing fee
and other arbitration costs subject to a final determination by the arbi-
trators of a fair apportionment of costs.”68 The court found this
appeal clause unconscionable because it forces the “appealing party
[to] bear the arbitral expenses for both parties in advance.”69  Inevita-
bly blurring the thin line between vindication-of-rights and unconscio-
nability defenses, the Sanchez court concluded that the possibility the
claimant might have to “advance unaffordable expenses . . . discour-
lawyer would “advance the required costs where the [arbitration] Agreement’s fee-
shifting provisions present little possibility of being made whole.” Id.
66 No. 11 MD 2293(DLC), 2012 WL 2478462, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012) (not-
ing that “[t]his case falls squarely within the ambit of the Second Circuit’s recent
opinion in Amex III.”).
67 Id.
68 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 25 (2011) (emphasis removed).
69 Id.  The court also found that the “reallocation between the parties at the end
of the proceeding . . . is inadequate.” Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 267, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“[That] possibility . . . provides little comfort
to consumers . . . who cannot afford to initiate the [appeal] process in the first
place.”)).
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ages buyers from pursuing an appeal and enforcing their rights
under” the state statute.70
In a similar vein, a Missouri plaintiff seeking to void an arbitra-
tion clause that required the parties to bear their own costs and
allowed the defendant to seek attorneys’ fees if successful presented
expert testimony from three consumer lawyers who testified it was
unlikely that she could retain counsel to pursue her individual claim
in arbitration because it “would not be financially viable for an attor-
ney [due to] the complicated nature of the case and the small dam-
ages at issue.”71  The Supreme Court of Missouri in Brewer v. Missouri
Title Loans agreed, finding the clause unconscionable because such
terms “stand[ ] as a substantial obstacle . . . to the resolution of any
consumer disputes against the title company.”72  Many state and fed-
eral courts—particularly in California73—have likewise applied case-
by-case cost-based analyses to strike down arbitration clauses following
Concepcion.74
70 Id.
71 Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Mo. 2012) (“Even if some
attorneys may take some cases because of the potential availability of fees under the
merchandising practices act, this does not prove that Brewer would have the benefit
of counsel in attempting to obtain a remedy on an individual basis.”).  The court
found this more compelling than the defendant’s assertion that the availability of
attorneys’ fees and punitive damages under the state merchandising act would incen-
tivize lawyers to represent individuals in arbitration. Id.; see also Smith v. Americredit
Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 09-cv-1076-DMS(BLM), 2012 WL 834784 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12,
2012) (following the reasoning of the court in Sanchez which held that the appeal
clause was unconscionable because it forced the appealing party to bear the arbitral
expenses for both parties in advance).
72 Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 493.
73 As one California district court noted:  “Undoubtedly, Concepcion has had some
effect [on] class action waivers in other states; however, its most profound effect—or,
at least, its most clearly identifiable and immediately anticipated effect—has been on
class action waivers in California, as it expressly repudiated California’s Discover Bank
rule.” In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, &
Prods. Liab. Litig., 838 F. Supp. 2d 967, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
74 See, e.g., Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 796–800 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012) (finding “substantial evidence” of unconscionability in an arbitration
clause wherein plaintiff was required to bear the “the excessive costs she would incur
in arbitrating before a three-judge panel in New York” and face an obligation to pay
the defendant’s attorneys’ fees if she lost in arbitration, “without granting her the
right to recoup her own attorney fees if she prevails”); Samaniego v. Empire Today
LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499–502 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that an arbitration
clause that requires plaintiff to pay any attorneys’ fees incurred by the employer, but
imposing no reciprocal obligation, is unconscionable); Trompeter v. Ally Fin., Inc.,
No. C-12-00391-CW, 2012 WL 1980894, *8 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (“Concepcion does
not preclude this Court’s finding that the arbitration agreement in the present case is
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At this early juncture, it is hard to make meaningful generaliza-
tions about lower courts’ treatment of cost-based challenges following
Concepcion.  To be sure, a subset of courts has held that Concepcion
flatly forecloses any cost-based challenge.75  But most courts have at
unconscionable because the finding does not undermine the fundamental attributes
of arbitration as an alternative form of dispute resolution that is neutral, speedy, eco-
nomical and informal.  The Court’s review of the arbitration agreement applies the
generally applicable contract principle of unconscionability and, thus, does not
offend the FAA’s policy objective favoring arbitration.”); Smith v. Americredit Fin.
Servs. Inc., No. 09-cv-1076-DMS(BLM), 2012 WL 834784 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012);
Rosendahl v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., No. 11-cv-61-GH(WVG), 2012 WL 667049, *9
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012) (“The parties shall bear their own costs and expenses.  The
parties also shall bear an equal share of the fees and costs of the arbitration . . .unless
the parties otherwise agree . . . .”); Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., No. C-11-3228
EMC, 2012 WL 581318, *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012) (striking down arbitration provi-
sion containing multiple unconscionable elements, which “evince[ed] a systematic
attempt by Defendants . . . to gain an unfair advantage over their customers by remit-
ting disputes to an inferior forum”) (citations omitted); Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); Hamby v.
Power Toyota Irvine, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Mission Viejo Emergency
Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 339 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011); Palmer v. Infosys Techs. Ltd., Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346–7 (M.D. Ala.
2011) (“While the Concepcion Court expressed concern about arbitration morphing
into a set of formalized, class-based procedures, this arbitration agreement is uncon-
scionable . . . because of its lack of mutuality as to the availability of arbitration and
the types of claims that may proceed to a judicial forum.”); In re Toyota Motor Corp.
Hybrid Brake Mktg., Sales, Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1163
n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (denying a motion to compel arbitration and finding it “uncer-
tain whether Concepcion would even apply to this instant action,” as it does not con-
cern “a dispute involving small sums of money, but . . . damages related to expensive
cars worth thousands of dollars”).
75 See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011)
(finding that “[i]nsofar as Florida law would invalidate [class action waivers] as con-
trary to public policy . . . such a state law would ‘stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution’ of the FAA, and thus be preempted” under Concepcion)
(internal citations omitted); Simpson v. Pulte Home Corp., No. C-115376-SBA, 2012
WL 1604840, *5 (N.D. Cal May 7, 2012) (“In view of Concepcion and its progeny, the
Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ contention that the class action waiver is substan-
tively unconscionable.”); Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. CIV.2:10-2373-WBS-GGH,
2011 WL 6702424, *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011) (refusing to consider public policy-
based arguments against enforcement of class action waiver because “those arguments
are not viable post-Concepcion [as] state laws advancing those policies are preempted
by the FAA”) (citations omitted); In re California Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-
01341-JSW, 2011 WL 2566449, at **2–3 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011); Clemins v. Alliance
Data Sys. Corp, No. 11-C-36 (E.D. Wisc. Oct. 12, 2011) (applying Concepcion and
enforcing class action waiver in credit card agreement); Chavez v. Bank of Am., No. C-
10-653-JCS, 2011 WL 4712204 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048-9 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (declaring that the vindication-of-
right doctrine has no viability after Concepcion, at least insofar as class action waivers
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least engaged the question of whether plaintiffs could vindicate their
rights under the arbitration clause at issue.  Towards those ends, one
would expect corporate defendants to generate dispute resolution
clauses that are designed to provide courts with comfort that the elim-
ination of aggregate procedures will not serve to prevent the vindica-
tion of rights.
II. “CONSUMER-FRIENDLY” ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Given the lavish praise the Supreme Court heaped on AT&T’s
consumer-friendly arbitration agreement in the Concepcion ruling, one
might expect that many companies would scramble to mimic that
clause in order to secure the precedential effects of the decision and
minimize any chance of class action liability exposure.76  The corpo-
rate blogosphere offers no shortage of detailed advice to clients and
potential clients on how they can bullet-proof their arbitration clauses
against cost-based vindication of rights challenges.77 Much of this
are concerned); Villegas v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C-10-1762, 2011 WL 2679610, (N.D.
Cal. June 20, 2011).
76 The AT&T arbitration provision states, in relevant part, that:
If, after finding in your favor in any respect on the merits of your claim, the
arbitrator issues you an award that is greater than the value of AT&T’s last
written settlement offer made before an arbitrator was selected, then AT&T
will:
• pay you the amount of the award or $10,000 (the “alternative payment”),
whichever is greater; and
• pay your attorney, if any, twice the amount of attorneys’ fees, and reim-
burse any expenses (including expert witness fees and costs), that your attor-
ney reasonably accrues for investigating, preparing, and pursuing your claim
in arbitration (“the attorney premium”) . . .
Although under some laws AT&T may have a right to an award of attorneys’
fees and expenses if it prevails in an arbitration, AT&T agrees that it will not
seek such an award.
AT&T WIRELESS: SUPPORT (2012), available at www.att.com/disputeresolution (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2012).
77 See, e.g., Asa Markel, California: Time to Revise Your Arbitration Agreements,
MASUDAFUNAI (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.masudafunai.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=
6945 (warning that because “California’s courts have struck provisions where they
believe the parties did not have equal bargaining power,” employers should “review
their agreements in light of the changing” legal landscape); Nicole Frush Munro,
Arbitration Remains in the Spotlight—Even Outside the Ninth Circuit, SPECIAL FIN. INSIDER
(May 16, 2012), http://www.specialfinanceinsider.com/16/548/ARTICLE/Arbitra-
tion-Remains-in-the-Spotlight—-Even-Outside-of-the-Ninth-Circuit.aspx (“For the
clauses to be valid, companies would do well to draft with a mind towards fairness and
respecting the interests of both parties.  Consumer contracts are generally contracts
of adhesion, so there is necessarily an unequal bargaining position.  Thus the onus
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advice explicitly urges prospective defendants to follow AT&T’s lead78
by providing that all fees and costs of suit are recoverable by a prevail-
ing plaintiff, and by offering cash bounties where claimants receive an
arbitration award superior to defendant’s final pre-award offer,
among other features.79
will always be on companies to use terms that are fair to consumers.  Self-regulation is
crucial to the continued viability of arbitration clauses.”); Robert J. Nobile, Human
Resources Guide, § 5.135: ARBITRATION (July 2012) (recommending that “companies
that have or plan to implement arbitration agreements should carefully consider the
provisions in their agreements to ensure that they do not arguably prevent the claim-
ant from vindicating his or her rights,” including agreeing “to pay all or most of the
arbitrator’s fees and expenses and any other costs unique to arbitration,” and “to pay
a claimant’s attorney’s fees and costs up to a set amount in the event he or she
prevails at arbitration”).
78 See, e.g., Gibson Dunn LLP, U.S. Supreme Court Finds That Class Action Waivers in
Arbitration Agreements Are Enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/USSupremeCourtFinds-ClassAc-
tionWaiversInArbitrationAgreementsAreEnforceableUnderFederalArbitration-
Act.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (“The wording of the majority decision in AT&T
Mobility does not seem to require similar provisions in an arbitration agreement,
although the Court did observe that the district court concluded that the guaranteed
amounts would put the Concepcions in a better position than if they were participants
in a class action.”); THOMAS E. GILBERTSEN & MICHAEL P. BRACKEN, Judicial Scrutiny of
Arbitration Clauses Under Concepcion, VENABLE LLP (Feb. 2012) (“The Concepcion deci-
sion itself begins with extended emphasis on all the ways AT&T Mobility’s arbitration
provision favored consumers and was fundamentally fair.  When it comes to crafting,
amending or litigating an arbitration provision in a consumer contract, that compari-
son is as good a place as any to start.”); Alan Kaplinsky, Status of Overdraft Fee Litigation,
1871 PLI/Corp. 209, 2011 (recommending that banks facing class action liability on
overdrafts—“only a handful [of which] have arbitration provisions”—draft “the types
of consumer-friendly features necessary to ensure enforceability”); see also JOSEPH M.
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 2.14 (8th ed. 2011) (“Although Con-
cepcion was not predicated on the existence of consumer-friendly provisions, cautious
drafting should lead companies to hew closely to the terms of the agreement involved
in that case and: [m]ake consumer arbitration low cost or cost-free [and] . . .
[c]onsider using premiums: financial incentives for customers or employees to arbi-
trate and allow arbitrators to award attorney’s fees.”).
79 See, e.g., Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Second Circuit Strikes Down Class Arbitra-
tion Provisions in In re American Express Merchants Litigation, *3 (Feb. 26, 2009),
available at http://www.weil.com/files/upload/WeilBriefing_LitReg_090226.pdf (last
visited Oct. 21, 2012) (“Another option for businesses to consider, to the extent they
wish to increase the possibility that their class arbitration waiver provisions will be
enforceable under In re American Express, is the inclusion of a fee-shifting provision for
attorneys’ fees and expert costs.”); Markel, supra note 77 (noting that “some of Cali-
fornia’s courts have struck arbitration clauses providing for the up-front payment of
fees” and urging clients to revise such provisions in existing clauses); Hilary B. Miller,
What Payday Lenders Need to Do About Arbitration (May 2, 2011), http://myemail.con-
stantcontact.com/What-Payday-Lenders-Need-To-Do-About-Arbitration—-Now.html?
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In order to test my supposition that post-Concepcion clauses
increasingly adopt such measures, I undertook to read and analyze a
group of recently-amended arbitration agreements in the contracts of
some of the biggest consumer-oriented companies in the country.  A
few preliminary (and perhaps obvious) points about the assumptions
that underlie my analysis in this Part:
First, I assume that would-be defendants are responsive to court
decisions on the enforceability of arbitration clauses.80  Since 2000, a
significant number of companies have inserted arbitration clauses
into their contracts with consumers and employees,81 and presumably,
soid=1101566873044&aid=SGkv356PqJU (last visited Oct. 21, 2012)  (“Lenders
should give serious consideration to updating their agreements to provide for every
one of the consumer protections included in the AT&T arbitration agreement. In
other words, at a minimum, the lender-eats-fees provision, venue, preservation of
small court claims, opt-out and bump-up provisions of AT&T’s clause should be an
element of any class action waiver provision.”).
80 For example, some commentators have suggested that “first-generation” arbi-
tration clauses were especially harsh and burdensome because defendants “felt
emboldened by their string of successes in the Supreme Court and thus began to
push the envelope by imposing increasingly burdensome and unexpected terms.”
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:  Strategic Judging and the Evolution
of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1457–58 (2008) (citing Michael H.
Leroy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back to the
Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 325 (2003) (suggesting, based on review of
nearly 400 court decisions spanning 1998–2001, that some employers’ arbitration
agreements are “testing the limits of self-advantage”)).  The late and much-missed
Richard Nagareda was the first to describe the evolutionary path of arbitration clauses
in the pages of this law review.  Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichot-
omy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1106 (describing “first-genera-
tion” arbitration clauses which included neither a class action waiver (as would a
second-generation clause) nor contractual provisions intended to make the arbitra-
tion agreement seem more consumer-friendly (as would a third-generation clause)).
81 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1167 (2012) (reporting on a study of con-
tracts imposed by financial services and telecommunications firms finding “that 75
percent contained mandatory arbitration clauses, and 80 percent contained class
action waivers,” and that “a stunning 93 percent of these companies’ employment
agreements mandated arbitration” (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–84 (2008)); see also Linda J. Demaine &
Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses:
The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 n.30 (2004) (find-
ing that approximately 55 percent “of businesses that offer an ongoing product or
service” included an arbitration clause in the written contract); Chris Drahozal &
Peter Rutledge, Contract and Choice, BYU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (reporting that
48% of consumer credit card agreements contain arbitration clauses, and that 99% of
those clauses contain class action waivers).
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they would like those clauses to be enforced if subject to legal chal-
lenge.  Furthermore, most companies can quickly amend their clauses
in response to or anticipation of litigation outcomes, revealing a nim-
ble and adaptive corporate feedback loop.82
This assumption appears well founded.  In 2008, Aaron-Andrew
Bruhl demonstrated that, “given the recent successes of unconsciona-
bility challenges, the most aggressive arbitration clauses are now being
scaled back.”83  In other words, at the height of unconscionability’s
success in beating back arbitration clauses, companies responded by
redrafting their provisions to make them less vulnerable to that chal-
lenge.  Moreover, in the four-year period between Buckeye Check Cash-
ing, Inc. v. Cardegna84 and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.,85 some arbitrators were interpreting contracts that were silent
on collective dispute resolution to nonetheless provide for class arbi-
tration.  As a result, “[b]usinesses moved quickly to block the possibil-
ity of collective redress in any forum, judicial or arbitral” by adding
severability and no-class-arbitration language to their contracts.86  We
should expect a similar response to Concepcion: some companies may
understand that cost-prohibitiveness is a concern for courts reviewing
the enforceability of arbitration clauses, and may therefore undertake
efforts to alleviate that concern in redrafting and amending their con-
sumer contracts.87
82 See Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer
Claims After the Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 440 (2012) (“It will take only seconds for businesses to
amend unilaterally their online contracts of adhesion and remove class actions from
existence, assuming they have not already done so.”).
83 Bruhl, supra note 79, at 1457 n.141.  Bruhl continues:  “Some business advo-
cates provide such an account, admitting that some early arbitration provisions were
unduly burdensome but contending that the clauses have now improved to become
more attractive to consumers.” Id. (citing Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 128 S. Ct. 2500
(2008) (“[C]onsumer arbitration provisions have been evolving.  At first, many provi-
sions plainly favored the business that drafted them.  Invoking state unconscionability
principles, several courts struck down these clauses . . . .”)).
84 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
85 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
86 Tracey & McGill, supra note 82, at 448.
87 Peter Coffman, Pendulum Still Swinging on Consumer Arbitration Clauses, THOM-
SON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHTS (July 10, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomson
reuters.com/Legal/Insight/2012/07_-_July/Pendulum_still_swinging_on_consumer
_arbitration_clauses/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2012) (“[A]ssuming that the arbitration
clause is prominently displayed and substantively even-handed, it should be fine
under Concepcion.  It should not have to lean heavily in favor of the consumer and
cases holding otherwise are likely unsound. . . . But, sound or unsound, such a clause
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Second, I assume that the clause at issue in Concepcion has
become a sort of gold standard to transactional attorneys.88  While
only a handful of post-Concepcion courts have engaged in side-by-side
comparisons of a challenged arbitration clause to that of AT&T, these
decisions amplify the significance of the “consumer-friendly” nature
of those provisions.89  In Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, discussed above,
the Missouri Supreme Court compared each element of the AT&T
agreement to the one at issue before finding the latter unconsciona-
ble.90  Similarly, in Feeney v. Dell, Inc., the Massachusetts Superior
Court found Concepcion was inapplicable to the facts of that case
because AT&T’s arbitration agreement had “so many pro-consumer
incentives that an individual consumer might be better off in arbitra-
tion than in class litigation [whereas] [t]he Dell Arbitration Clause
provides no incentives and simply requires arbitration of all disputes,
even those that could not possibly justify the expense in light of the
amount in controversy.”91  The Feeney Court concluded “the differ-
ences matter.”92  These decisions, as well as other post-Concepcion cases
that admiringly describe the AT&T arbitration clause (albeit in
dicta),93 send a signal to putative defendants and their general coun-
may still be a lightning rod to lower courts, and most businesses would rather not be
the test case.”).
88 Indeed, a district court judge once described AT&T’s arbitration provision as
“perhaps the most fair and consumer-friendly provisions this Court has ever seen.”
Makarowski v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 2009 WL 1765661, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
89 But see NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (“The fact that the arbitration provisions in AT&T Mobility
may have been more generous to consumers than the provisions here does not affect
the force of the Supreme Court’s preemption analysis.  The Court’s analysis turned
on general doctrinal principles rather than the specific wording of the cellular con-
tracts.” (citation omitted)).
90 364 S.W.3d at 493 (“Unlike in Concepcion, in which AT&T shouldered the costs
of arbitration and would pay double the customer’s attorney’s fees if the customer
recovered more than AT&T had offered prior to arbitration, the agreement here pro-
vides that the parties are to bear their own costs.”); id. (“In Concepcion, the arbitration
clause waived AT & T’s right to seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees incurred in
defending against a consumer’s claim.  In contrast, the title company did not waive its
right to seek attorney’s fees and, therefore, could seek to recover attorney’s fees
incurred in defending a claim.”); id. at 493–4 (“The evidence in this case is also fun-
damentally different from that in Concepcion because Brewer presented expert testi-
mony from three consumer lawyers who testified it was unlikely that a consumer could
retain counsel to pursue individual claims.  There was no such record in Concepcion.”).
91 No. MICV-2003-01158, 2011 WL 5127806, *8 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 4, 2011).
92 Id. at *9.
93 See, e.g., Winn v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 2011 WL 294407, at *10 (W.D. Tenn.
2011); Khan v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 2011 WL 4853365, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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sels that adding pro-consumer incentives may help bullet-proof an
arbitration clause from challenge.
Third, I assume corporate entities are not only responsive to judi-
cial attitudes on the fairness of their arbitration clauses, but also to the
views of other policymakers and the public at large.  Companies have
an interest in not having their dispute resolution procedures appear
harsh or unfair to these constituencies.  For example, the recently-
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is currently
studying the impact of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.94  If,
after the completion of its arbitration study, “the agency were to issue
regulations prohibiting the use of class action waivers in consumer
financial products, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Concepcion would be
upended, at least for those contracts over which the CFPB has direct
authority.”95  While advocates on both sides are expecting this is
“exactly what the agency will do,”96 should the agency’s study reveal
that an increasing number of arbitration provisions were actually con-
sumer-friendly in a variety of ways such that claimants could vindicate
their rights, this would go a long way in determining what, if any,
action the politically-embattled agency might take.
Additionally, Congress continues to consider the Arbitration Fair-
ness Act, which would amend the FAA to invalidate all arbitration
clauses in consumer or employment contracts.97  While the bill is
unlikely to make it out of the current House,98 “supporters of the bill
94 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1021, 12
U.S.C § 5511 (2010).  Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically requires the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to conduct a study of and submit a report to
Congress on the use of arbitration in consumer transactions, and “prohibit or impose
conditions or limitations on the use of . . . arbitration of any future dispute between
the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or
limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”  12 U.S.C
§ 5518.
95 Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 656 (citations omitted).
96 Id. at 657 (citing Winston & Strawn LLP, The Bureau of Consumer Financial Pro-
tection: Broad Authority to Regulate Arbitration Agreements 2 (July 2010), available at http:/
/www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/ArbitrationClientBriefing.pdf (last visited
Nov. 27, 2012) (“The Bureau’s consumer protection mandate may suggest that
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses may end up on the cutting room floor.”);
Daniel Fisher, After Arbitration Ruling, Watch Warren’s Consumer Bureau, FORBES (Apr.
27, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/04/27/after-arbitration-
ruling-watch-warrens-consumer-bureau/.
97 S. 987, 112th Cong, 1st Sess., in 157 CONG. REC. S2929 (May 12, 2011).
98 Earlier versions of this bill were introduced in 2007 and 2009, and both times
died in committee. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4, 155 CONG. REC. H1517 (Feb 12, 2009) (invalidating agreements requiring
arbitration of employment, consumer and civil rights disputes); Arbitration Fairness
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claim that the ground work is being laid for passage down the road.”99
As courts citing Concepcion enforce close-to-the line arbitration provi-
sions, “public outcry may force Congress to act if the pendulum swings
too far in favor of the defense bar.”100  Corporate entities could
endeavor to avoid courting the displeasure of agencies and legislators
by promoting better, more pro-consumer arbitration clauses.
A. Modeling AT&T’s Arbitration Clause
I conducted a qualitative examination of thirty-seven current arbi-
tration clauses to test whether companies were indeed rewriting their
clauses to resemble the AT&T provisions examined by the Supreme
Court in Concepcion.  I examined arbitration clauses in a range of
industries—from telecommunications, consumer banking and credit
cards, e-commerce, and entertainment—focusing on some of the
nation’s largest and most well-known companies.101  My research assis-
tant and I collected these clauses by visiting the companies’ websites,
where this information is publicly available.  We searched for versions
of these agreements current as of May–August 2012, and tracked a
number of elements.102  Importantly, we only included in this sample
Act of 2007, S1782 § 4, 110th Cong, 1st Sess., 153 CONG. REC. S9144 (July 12, 2007)
(invalidating agreements requiring arbitration of employment, consumer and civil
rights disputes); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong, 1st Sess.,
§ 4, 153 CONG. REC. H7774 (July 12, 2007) (invalidating agreements requiring arbitra-
tion of employment, consumer and civil rights disputes). In the immediate wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion, Senators Al Franken and Richard Blu-
menthal, along with Congressman Hank Johnson, reintroduced a 2011 version of the
bill, which would prohibit class waivers in all consumer, employment, and civil-rights-
related contracts.  This most recent version has also failed to garner much legislative
support. See, e.g., Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011, at A26
(noting that the chances of federal legislation overriding Concepcion “aren’t great in
the current political environment”).
99 James P. Karen et al., Federal Procedure and Evidence Update, 58 THE ADVOCATE 7
(2012); see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 652 (noting that “observers appear
uniform in their assessment that this bill stands little chance of passage in the current
political environment”).
100 Karen, supra note 99, at 7. See also Drahozal and Rutledge, supra note 81, at __,
n. 11 (describing a variety of bills that Congress has enacted that would invalidate
predispute resolution clauses in specific types of contracts).
101 Following the lead of other scholars who have engaged in empirical studies of
arbitration clauses, we identified companies with “significant market share or name
recognition in the telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries.”
Eisenberg et al., supra note 81, at 880 (describing methodology for gathering data on
arbitration clauses for empirical analysis).
102 For example, we noted: the location of the arbitration; the payment of filing
fees, attorneys’ fees, and other costs; whether there was a bounty offered for success;
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binding arbitration clauses, rather than voluntary clauses.103  Table 1
reports the companies studied, the source of the information, and the
effective date of the most recent arbitration clause examined:
EFFECTIVE
COMPANY INDUSTRY SOURCE DATE
AMAZON E-COMMERCE http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/ AUG. 19,
customer/display.html/ref=hp_200905880 2011
_conditions?nodeId=508088
AMERICAN CREDIT https://web.aexp-static.com/us/content/ MAR. 31,
EXPRESS pdf/cardmember-agreements/gold/ 2012
AmericanExpressGoldCard.pdf
BARNES & E-COMMERCE http://www.barnesandnobleinc.com/ JAN. 2012
NOBLE misc/terms_of_use.html
BB&T BANK & CREDIT LEAP Account Cardholder Terms & APR. 1, 2012
Conditions (on file)
BEST BUY E-COMMERCE http://www.bestbuy.com/site/Computers- JUNE 23,
3rd-Party/Subscription-Services/pcmcat16 2011
2100050037.c?id=pcmcat162100050037
CABLEVISION TELECOM http://www.optimum.net/Terms/OV OCT. 2011
CHASE BANK & CREDIT https://www.chase.com/online/services/ FEB. 2, 2012
document/deposit_account_agreement.
pdf
CITIBANK BANK & CREDIT Checking Plus (Variable Rate) Account JUNE 1, 2012
Disclosure Agreement (on file)
CLEARWIRE TELECOM http://www.clearwire.com/legal/terms-of- MAY 11, 2012
service
COMCAST TELECOM http://www.comcast.com/corporate/ MAR. 2011
customers/policies/subscriberagreement.
html
DELL E-COMMERCE http://www.dell.com/content/topics/ SEPT. 26,
global.aspx/policy/en/policy?c=us&cs=19 2011
&l=en&s=dhs&~section=012#ustc
DISCOVER CREDIT https://www.discover.com/credit-cards/ APR. 7, 2012
cardmember-agreement/arbitration.html
the availability of and payment for appealing arbitral decisions; opt-out clauses and
timing; capped damages; limited discovery; and the effective date.  Spreadsheet on
file with the author.
103 For example Google, Yahoo!, and eBay provide users with a choice between
arbitration and litigation in state or federal courts in California. See Terms of Service,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last updated Mar. 1,
2012); Terms of Service, YAHOO! § 27, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/
en-us/ (last updated Nov. 24, 2008); User Agreement, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/
help/policies/user-agreement.html?_trksid=m40 (last updated Aug. 21, 2012).
Paypal had a similar agreement in place until November 1, 2012, when the company
announced a change in its policy to require binding arbitration. See Amendment to the
Paypal Debit Card Cardholder Agreement, PAYPAL, https://cms.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/
marketingweb?cmd=_render-content&fli=true&content_ID=ua/upcoming_policies_
full&locale.x=en_US (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).
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E-TRADE BANKING https://us.etrade.com/e/t/prospectesta JULY 2012
tion/help?id=1209021000
ELECTRONIC ENTERTAINMENT http://tos.ea.com/legalapp/WEB NOV. 28,
ARTS TERMS/US/en/PC/ 2011
GOLD’S GYM SERVICE http://www.goldsgym.com/giftcard/ 2012
terms/
GROUPON E-COMMERCE http://www.groupon.com/terms DEC. 7, 2011
HULU ENTERTAINMENT http://www.hulu.com/terms MAR. 16,
2012
MATCH SERVICE http://www.match.com/registration/arbi APR. 9, 2012
trationProcedures.aspx
NASCAR ENTERTAINMENT http://www.nascar.com/guides/terms/ MAY 2011
trackpass/
NETFLIX CONTENT https://account.netflix.com/TermsOfUse MAR. 7, 2012
#arbitration
NORDSTROM EMPLOYMENT http://about.nordstrom.com/careers/ JUNE 2011
pdfs/2697_0611_ADR_Agreement.pdf
PEP BOYS SERVICE http://www.pepboys.com/customer_care/ JAN. 2012
policies/settlements








SCHWAB BANK http://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-21 MAR. 2012
23214/APP38165-11WB.pdf
SOVEREIGN BANK & CREDIT http://www.sovereignbank.com/ JAN. 2012
personal/docs/deposit-account-agree
ment-MA.pdf
SONY ENTERTAINMENT http://www.sonyentertainmentnetwork. FEB. 7, 2012
com/terms-of-service/
SPRINT TELECOM http://shop2.sprint.com/en/legal/legal_ 2012
terms_privacy_popup.shtml
T-MOBILE TELECOM http://www.t-mobile.com/Templates/ DEC. 30,
Popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndCon 2011
ditions&print=true
TICKETMASTER SERVICE http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/terms. JAN. 27, 2012
html
TIME WARNER TELECOM http://www.timewarnercable.com/nynj/ 2012
about/policies/regulatorynotices/sub
scriberagreement/
TRACFONE CELLULAR http://www.tracfone.com/terms_ JUNE 24,
conditions.jsp 2011
U.S. BANK BANK & CREDIT https://www4.usbank.com/internetBank 2012
ing/en_us/transfer/CheckingAcct
AdvanceTerms.jsp
VANGUARD INVESTMENT https://ontheroad.vanguard.com/get 2008
ready/documents/30588_51_vai_bro
chure.pdf
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VERIZON TELECOM http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/ FEB. 19, 2012
WIRELESS support/customer-agreement
WELLS FARGO BANK & CREDIT https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/ FEB. 2, 2012
pdf/credit_cards/agreements/wf_secured
_card.pdf
XBOX LIVE ENTERTAINMENT http://support.xbox.com/en-US/xbox- JUNE 2012
live/contract-subscription/terms-and-con
ditions
A few conclusions are worth noting at the forefront.  First, all the
clauses I examined contained class action waivers.  While this is not
surprising, it represents a clear increase in the popularity of these pro-
visions over the past decade.104  Second, nearly all the clauses had
been amended in the aftermath of Concepcion.  Indeed, I could find
few arbitration clauses that hadn’t been amended in 2011–2012, and
presumably, many of these changes reflect the addition of pro-con-
sumer provisions.105  Third, fewer companies than I had expected
have copied the more generous aspects of AT&T’s clause— i.e., provi-
sions offering automatic cost-shifting, bounties, premiums and doub-
ling of attorneys’ fees.  Of the thirty-seven arbitration clauses
examined, only six companies offered anything close to AT&T’s set of
incentives, and none were quite as generous.
1. Cost Allocation
The most common consumer-friendly provision that may have
been added to arbitration clauses in the post-Concepcion wave of
amendments is the promise to pick up the tab for all initiation fees,
104 So, for example, a 2004 study of 52 consumer arbitration clauses found only
30.8% contained class action waivers.  Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Vol-
unteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Expe-
rience, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 65 (2004).  A 2009 study by the Searle Institute found
36.5% of arbitration clauses contained a class action waiver. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE
INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION: BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 103
(2009) (preliminary report), available at http://www.adr.org/.
105 It is impossible to state with certainty that all the amendments reflect pro-con-
sumer additions because we found only one company (T-Mobile) that provides prior
iterations of its arbitration clauses on its website, and could locate prior versions of
only six other companies’ arbitration clauses for direct comparison (DirectTV, Chase,
Discover, BB&T, AmEx, and Wells Fargo) [on file with the author].  Furthermore, a
number of the clauses we examined did not include arbitration clauses at all prior to
Concepcion (Sony, Xbox, Regions Bank and Netflix), so these are not amendments to
existing clauses but instead reflect the initial adoption of arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution.  Nevertheless, it seems sensible to presume that, given that so
many companies amended their arbitration clauses or added arbitration clauses in
the immediate wake of Concepcion, a fair number did so in response to that decision
and likely added pro-consumer language.
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deposits, and costs of the arbitral proceeding.  DirectTV, for example,
had in 2010 an arbitration clause that required the claimant to “pay
an arbitration initiation fee equal to [a] court filing fee, not to exceed
$125” and to pay all costs of arbitration—a fairly typical clause for that
period.106  After Concepcion, the company amended its clause, agree-
ing “to pay the arbitration initiation fee and any additional deposit
required by JAMS to initiate your arbitration [as well as] the costs of
the arbitration proceeding.”107  Similar provisions are reflected in the
current arbitration clauses of seven companies in our sample: Cablevi-
sion,108 Chase,109 Clearwire,110 Dell,111 Match,112 Sprint,113 and Tick-
etmaster.114  Again, while these companies may not have added pro-
106 On file with the author (printed version of older DTV agreement and web
capture of new agreement).
107 See, e.g., Customer Agreement, DIRECTTV § 9 (May 15, 2012), available at
www.directv.com/DTVAPP/content/legal/customer_agreement.
108 See Terms of Service, OPTIMUM § 9 (Sept. 17, 2012), available at  http://www.
optimum.net/Terms/OV (last visited July 19, 2012) (“Cablevision will advance all
arbitration filing fees and arbitrator’s costs and expenses upon your written request
prior to the commencement of the arbitration.”).
109 See Deposit Account Agreement, CHASE BANK § 12 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at
www.chase.com/online/services/document/deposit_account_agreement.pdf (“We
will pay any costs that are required to be paid by us under the arbitration administra-
tor’s rules of procedure. Even if not otherwise required, we will reimburse you up to
$500 for any initial arbitration filing fees you have paid. We will also pay any fees of
the arbitrator and arbitration administrator for the first two days of any hearing. If
you win the arbitration, we will reimburse you for any fees you paid to the arbitration
organization and/or arbitrator.”).  Importantly, the 2009 version of Chase’s arbitra-
tion clause contains virtually the same language as its 2011 amendment, so there was
no pro-consumer addition to the arbitration clause.  (2009 version of Chase Account
Agreement on file with the author)
110 See Terms of Service, CLEARWIRE § 13(c) (May 11, 2012), available at www.clear
wire.com/legal/terms-of-service (“Clearwire will pay all filing, administration, and
arbitrator fees, unless your claim exceeds $75,000.”).
111 See Terms and Conditions, DELL § 13 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at www.dell.com/
content/topics/global.aspx/policy/en/policy?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs&~section=
012#ustc (“Dell will be responsible for paying any individual consumer’s arbitration
fees.”).
112 See Arbitration Procedures, MATCH.COM, available at http://www.match.com/
registration/arbitrationProcedures.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).
113 See Terms and Conditions, SPRINT, available at http://shop2.sprint.com/en/
legal/legal_terms_privacy_popup.shtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2012) (“We each are
responsible for our respective costs relating to counsel, experts, and witnesses  . . . .
However, we will pay for the arbitration administrative or filing fees, including the
arbitrator fees.”)
114 See Terms of Use, TICKETMASTER § 18 (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.ticketmaster.
com/h/terms.html (agreeing to “pay all JAMS filing, administration, and arbitrator
fees for any arbitration initiated in accordance with the notice requirements”).
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consumer language in these recent amendments to their arbitration
clauses, the likelihood is that they did.
Most companies we studied have not gone so far as to offer to pay
all upfront costs of arbitration.  We found seven arbitration clauses,
for example, that instead agreed to advance filing fees upon receipt of
a written request or statement indicating the claimant’s inability to
pay.115  Companies then differ on whether and when the claimant
must repay the advance.  Time Warner and Discover, for example,
require the consumer to reimburse the company any fees advanced if
she loses in arbitration.116  American Express, on the other hand,
waives the right to seek reimbursement of fees from a losing card-
holder.117  Another approach is reflected in U.S. Bank’s arbitration
provision, which advances the filing fee and then leaves it to “the arbi-
trator [to] decide whether we or you will ultimately pay those fees.”118
Under this agreement, consumers must pay fees and proceed with
arbitration not knowing whether the arbitrator will ultimately reallo-
cate those fees in the award or cap them under consumer arbitration
rules.
An interesting example here is Groupon, whose arbitration
clause was amended in late 2011.  The arbitration clause specifically
provides that “in the event that [the claimant is] able to demonstrate
115 These seven companies are: Discover, BB&T, American Express, U.S. Bank,
Groupon, Time Warner and Comcast. See, e.g., Cardmember Agreement, DISCOVER
(2012), available at https://www.discover.com/assets/Prime_Combined.pdf; LEAP
Account Cardholder Terms and Conditions, BB&T ¶ 32, available at http://www.bbt.com/
sites/bbtdotcom/banking/cards/docs/leap-account-terms-and-conditions.pdf (last
visited Dec. 4, 2012).
116 For example, Time Warner agrees to “advance” filing fees and arbitration costs
upon written request, but also warns that if it wins in arbitration, the customer “will
reimburse us for these advances.” Residential Services Subscriber Agreement, TIME
WARNER, ¶ 15 available at http://www.timewarnercable.com/nynj/about/policies/
regulatorynotices/subscriberagreement/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).  Discover leaves it
to the arbitrator to decide “whether you must reimburse us for money we advanced
for you to for the arbitration.” Arbitration, DISCOVER, available at https://www.discover.
com/credit-cards/cardmember-agreement/arbitration.html (last updated Apr. 7,
2012).
117 See, e.g., Gold Card Cardholder Agreement, AMERICAN EXPRESS (June 30, 2012),
available at  https://web.aexp-static.com/us/content/pdf/cardmember-agreements/
gold/ AmericanExpressGoldCard.pdf (“At your written request, we will consider in
good faith making a temporary advance of all or part of your share of any arbitration
fees. You will not be assessed any arbitration fees in excess of your share if you do not
prevail in any arbitration with us.”).
118 Checking Account Advance, U.S. BANK, available at https://www4.usbank.com/
internetBanking/en_us/transfer/CheckingAcctAdvanceTerms.jsp (last visited Dec. 4,
2012).
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that the costs of arbitration will be prohibitive as compared to the
costs of litigation, Groupon will pay as much of [the] filing and hear-
ing fees in connection with the arbitration as the arbitrator deems
necessary to prevent the arbitration from being cost-prohibitive .”119  This
not-so-subtle signal to claimants and reviewing courts is intended to
weaken any vindication-of-rights challenge to Groupon’s arbitration
clause.
Still other entities require the claimant to advance the filing fee,
with a promise to reimburse her upon some triggering event.  Netflix,
for example, promises to reimburse the claimant as soon as it receives
notice that a valid arbitration has been filed.120  Citibank, on the other
hand, promises to reimburse the claimant her AAA filing fee if she
wins in the arbitral forum.121
Other arbitration clauses offer to pay some amount short of the
entire filing fee.  We found two companies that agreed to pay half the
arbitral filing fee (but no other costs) for consumer-initiated arbitra-
tions.122  Others sought to measure arbitral filing fees against the fil-
ing fee in small claims court, offering to pay any difference in these
amounts.123  But given that both the AAA and JAMS124 require a $250
filing fee to arbitrate any consumer claim worth less than $10,000—
and that small claims courts in most jurisdictions require filing fees
significantly lower than $250—this promise to “pay the overage” is
generally misleading.125
The best example of increasingly pro-consumer amendments is
T-Mobile, whose website contains four different arbitration clauses
119 Terms, GROUPON ¶ 16, available at http://www.groupon.com/terms#arbitration
(last updated Sept. 24, 2012) (emphasis added).
120 Terms of Use, NETFLIX (Sept. 14, 2012), available at https://account.netflix.
com/TermsOfUse#arbitration
121 Citibank Checking Plus (on file with the author).
122 See, e.g., Account Agreement, E-TRADE (July 2012), available at https://us.etrade.
com/e/t/prospectestation/help?id=1209021000 (“If you initiate arbitration, the
Bank will pay one half of any arbitration filing fee. You will pay the rest of the filing
fee and all of the arbitration fees charged by the arbitration forum and the arbitrator
through the first day of the arbitration, up to a maximum of eight hours. The Bank
and you will split any remaining fees.”); Deposit Agreement, REGIONS BANK 22 (2012),
available at http://www.regions.com/virtualdocuments/Deposit_Agreement_Oct_10.
pdf.
123 See, e.g., Arbitration Process, PEP BOYS (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.pep
boys.com/customer_care/policies/settlements; Terms & Conditions, GOLD’S GYM,
available at http://www.goldsgym.com/giftcard/terms/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).
124 These are the most commonly designated arbitral forms listed in all thirty-
seven of the contracts we examined.
125 See Consumer Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, available at www.adr.org/aaa/
faces/aoe/gc/consumer (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).
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depending on when the consumer initiated service, each iteration
growing increasing consumer-friendly.126  For example, the 2004
clause requires the claimant to pay a small arbitral fee ($25) for all
claims between $25–$1000, and commands both parties to pay their
own “other fees, costs, and expenses, including those for any attor-
neys, experts, and witnesses.”127  The more recent version incorpo-
rates a 30 day opt-out, promises to pay all “filing, administration[,]
and arbitrator fees” for claims under $75,000, allows successful claim-
ants to recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs[,]” and T-Mobile
“agrees not to seek an award of attorneys’ fees” in non-frivolous arbi-
trations.128  A number of companies have recently added identical
tiered provisions to their arbitration clauses.129
2. Bounties, Premium Payments, and “Bump-Ups”
As noted above, few companies have gone as far as AT&T in pro-
viding a bounty to claimants who achieve a better result in arbitration
than the company’s last-best offer.  In my small sample of 37 arbitra-
tion clauses, only six companies had such a clause,130 with some minor
126 Terms and Conditions, T-MOBILE (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://www.t-
mobile.com/Templates/Popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions&print=
true (“Did you activate (or renew) service prior to December 30, 2011? If yes, please
click the date for the applicable version of the Terms and Conditions: July 24, 2011 —
July 18, 2010 — June 28, 2008 — December 2004.”).
127 Terms and Conditions, T-MOBILE (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.t-mobile.
com/Templates/Popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions2004&print=true.
128 T-Mobile Terms and Conditions, T-MOBILE (July 24, 2011), available at http://
www.t-mobile.com/Templates/Popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditionsJuly
2011&print=true.
129 See, e.g., Terms of Service, CLEARWIRE § 13 (May 11, 2012), available at www.clear
wire.com/legal/terms-of-service.
130 Verizon, Netflix, Electronic Arts, Microsoft Xbox, Sallie Mae, Sovereign Bank;
see, e.g., Customer Agreement Arbitration Clause, VERIZON WIRELESS ¶ 6 (Sept. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.proandcontracts.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2011.
09.08-Verizon-Wireless-Arbitration-Clause.pdf (“WE MAY MAKE A WRITTEN SET-
TLEMENT OFFER ANYTIME BEFORE ARBITRATION BEGINS. IF YOU DON’T
ACCEPT THE OFFER, OR IF WE DON’T MAKE YOU AN OFFER, AND THE ARBI-
TRATOR AWARDS YOU AN AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT’S MORE THAN OUR
OFFER BUT LESS THAN $5000, THEN WE AGREE TO PAY YOU $5000 INSTEAD
OF THE AMOUNT AWARDED. IN THAT CASE WE ALSO AGREE TO PAY ANY
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE LAW
REQUIRES IT FOR YOUR CASE. IF THE ARBITRATOR AWARDS YOU MORE
THAN $5000, THEN WE WILL PAY YOU THAT AMOUNT.”); Terms of Use, NETFLIX
(Sept. 14, 2012), available at https://account.netflix.com/TermsOfUse#arbitration
(“If the arbitrator issues you an award that is greater than the value of Netflix’s last
written settlement offer . . . then Netflix will pay you the amount of the award or US
$1,000, whichever is greater.”).
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deviations.  For example, Sallie Mae provides that borrowers who suc-
cessfully arbitrate a claim will be awarded “at least $7,500 plus any
arbitration fees and attorneys’ fees and costs,”131 but doesn’t offer to
double attorneys’ fees.  Electronic Arts’ arbitration provision has
another slight variation in which the bounty is a capped percentage of
the last-best offer rather than a set amount.132  Netflix offers a bounty
of $1000 if the claimant gets a higher award in arbitration.133  Verizon,
the only direct competitor of AT&T in this group, offers to pay a
$5000 bounty and reasonable fees.134  Perhaps the most explicit is
Microsoft, whose arbitration provision for the Xbox platform states:
If You reject Microsoft’s last written settlement offer made before
the arbitrator was appointed . . . [and] Your dispute goes all the way
to an arbitrator’s decision . . .  and the arbitrator awards You more
than Microsoft’s last written offer, Microsoft will give You three
incentives: (i) pay the greater of the award or $1,000; (ii) pay twice
Your reasonable attorney’s fees, if any; and (iii) reimburse any
expenses (including expert witness fees and costs) that Your attor-
ney reasonably accrues for investigating, preparing, and pursuing
Your claim in arbitration.135
These “three incentives” match up neatly with AT&T’s arbitration
clause, though the latter pays a higher bounty and doubles attorneys’
fees upon success in the arbitral forum.  Notably, we found only one
131 Bar Study Loan Promissory Note 3BAR1205/3BAI1205, SALLIE MAE, § T, ¶ 11,
available at https://www1.salliemae.com/content/pdf/BarStudy_ApplicationPackage.
pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (containing a “Special Payment” provisions that states
that “[if] you refuse to provide the relief I request; and [ ] an arbitrator subsequently
determines that I was entitled to such relief (or greater relief), the arbitrator shall
award me at least $7,500 plus any arbitration fees and attorneys’ fees and costs”).
Note that the Bar Study Loan agreement contained the only “Special Payment” provi-
sion I was able to find in the many Sallie Mae promissory notes available online.
132 See, e.g., Terms of Service, ELECTRONIC ARTS ¶ 20 (Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http://tos.ea.com/legalapp/WEBTERMS/US/en/PC/ (providing that if the arbitra-
tor rules in the claimant’s favor and issues an award “that is greater in monetary value
than EA’s last written settlement offer,” then EA will “[p]ay you 150% of your arbitra-
tion award, up to $5,000 over and above your arbitration award” and pay attorneys’
fees and costs).
133 Terms of Use, NETFLIX (Sept. 14, 2012), available at https://account.netflix.
com/TermsOfUse#arbitration
134 Customer Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS (Feb. 19, 2012), available at http://
www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/support/customer-agreement.
135 Terms and Conditions for the Xbox Console Bundle/Xbox Live Promotional Offer,
MICROSOFT § 12.6.1 (2012), available at http://support.xbox.com/en-US/xbox-live/
contract-subscription/terms-and-conditions.
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arbitration clause that explicitly offered to pay the prevailing con-
sumer her expert fees.136
It is certainly possible that there are other companies out there
that pay bounties or premiums, or that companies are adding such
provisions presently.  As the legal dust settles, it may be reasonable to
assume that the rate of pro-consumer addenda will pick up137—espe-
cially given how easy it is for most entities to effectuate changes in
their dispute resolution procedures.138
B. “Unfriendly” Clauses
A number of companies have amended their clauses in the past
two years, but have failed to add any pro-consumer cost-shifting provi-
sions.  For example, customers who are unsuccessful in arbitrating
claims against Comcast and Time Warner cable must pay those com-
panies’ costs and attorneys’ fees, as well any costs of appealing the
judgment.139  Even in the post-Concepcion era, courts have held these
sorts of provisions unenforceable.140  Another somewhat ironic exam-
ple is Sallie Mae’s Bar Study Loan program, which covers living and
other expenses of law school graduates during the months they are
studying for the bar exam.  The 2012 version of the loan agreement
contains an arbitration clause requiring borrowers who initiate arbi-
tration to “bear the fees charged by . . . the arbitrator . . . [and] the
reasonable and actual expense of [her] attorneys, experts, and wit-
136 See Personal Deposit Account Agreement, SOVEREIGN BANK 24, available at http://
www.sovereignbank.com/personal/docs/deposit-account-agreement-MA.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 16, 2012) (stating that the company “will pay your reasonable attorneys’ and
experts’ fees if and to the extent you prevail” in arbitration).
137 See, e.g., Amicus Br. of AT&T Moblility, 2008 WL 534808, at *5 (filed Feb. 25,
2008), in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 128 S. Ct. 2500 (2008) (No. 07-976) (pre-
Concepcion brief describing “the continued evolution of both arbitration clauses” in
the marketplace and “the law governing their enforceability,” and urging the denial
of certiorari to allow for percolation and development of consumer-friendly clauses
such as AT&T’s).
138 Companies can easily include new arbitral rules in software updates, bill-stuff-
ers, and other easy, cheap means of effectuating changes-in-terms. See Eric Andrew
Horwitz, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions as Used in Consumer Service Contracts of
Adhesion, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75 (2007).
139 Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, COMCAST § 13(h), available at http://
www.comcast.com/corporate/customers/policies/subscriberagreement.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 16, 2012); Time Warner Cable Residential Services Subscriber Agreement, TIME
WARNER CABLE § 15(d), available at http://help.twcable.com/html/twc_sub_agree
ment.html (“If TWC wins the arbitration, you will reimburse us for these advances.”).
140 See supra notes 47–48 (discussing cases finding a failure to shift costs to be
unconscionable).
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nesses, regardless of which party prevails in the arbitration . . . .”141
But oddly, where Sallie Mae commences arbitration against a bor-
rower, the clause requires the borrower to “pay all such reasonable
and actual fees of [Sallie Mae] if [it] prevail[s] in an arbitra-
tion . . . .”142  The asymmetry is striking, given the population of newly-
minted and eager lawyers signing this agreement who might someday
mount a challenge.  Among the sample companies, only Tracfone has
a similar provision.143
Two of the clauses I reviewed simply do not mention costs at all.
Hulu has a  standard arbitration clause—noting which arbitral bodies
can be employed, where the arbitration will be held, that class arbitra-
tion and other aggregate and representative forms are prohibited—
but makes no mention whatsoever about cost allocation.144  But such
an approach is rare, presumably because silence on payment of costs
sets up an argument that the default rule—initiating claimant pays the
filing fees and is responsible for her own costs—applies, and this rule
in turn makes viable a vindication-of-rights or unconscionability
argument.
Finally, four companies in the sample leave all determinations of
fees and costs to the arbitrator to decide, referencing the rules and
procedures of the AAA or JAMS governing costs.145  Sony Entertain-
ment, for example, which courted controversy from the gaming com-
munity when it added an arbitration clause with a class action waiver
141 Bar Study Loan Promissory Note 3BAR1205/3BAI1205, SALLIE MAE § T(6), availa-
ble at https://www1.salliemae.com/salliemaenew/application/displaydocument.aspx?
partner=/barstudyloans/slmaedtrust&type=borr (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).
142 Id.
143 See, e.g., TracFone Wireless, Inc. Terms and Conditions of Service, TRACFONE WIRE-
LESS ¶ 23, available at http://www.tracfone.com/terms_conditions.jsp (last updated
June 24, 2011) (“Each party will bear the expenses of its own counsel, experts, wit-
nesses, and preparation and presentation of evidence.”).
144 See Terms of Use, HULU ¶ 13 (last visited Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://
www.hulu.com/terms; see also NASCAR.COM TrackPass Terms of Use, NASCAR.COM § 14,
available at http://www.nascar.com/guides/terms/trackpass/ (last visited Sept. 16,
2012) (lacking mention of cost allocation).
145 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Card Customer Agreement & Disclosure Statement, WELLS
FARGO § 31(d) (2002), available at https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/
credit_cards/agreements/wf_secured_card.pdf (noting that the claimant and the
company each “shall bear the expense of our own attorney, expert and witness fees,
regardless of which of us prevails in the arbitration”); LEAP Account Cardholder Terms
and Conditions, BB&T ¶ 32, available at http://www.bbt.com/sites/bbtdotcom/bank-
ing/cards/docs/leap-account-terms-and-conditions.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2012);
Terms of Use, NETFLIX (last visited Sept. 14, 2012), available at https://account.netflix.
com/TermsOfUse#arbitration (stating that “the payment of all filing, administration
and arbitrator fees will be governed by the AAA Rules”).
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to its PlayStation Network Agreement in September 2012,146 provides
that where the consumer successfully arbitrates a claim, Sony will pay
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs “as determined by the arbitra-
tor.”147  Arguably, these provisions afford arbitrators the latitude to
award otherwise non-recoupable expense items, such as the expert
fees at issue in Amex.  But of course, the practical problem with the
“winner takes” approach is that it is only triggered upon final judg-
ment; i.e., a winner and a loser must be declared.  So, the extent to
which such clauses allow for the effective vindication of rights
depends, in no small measure, upon the formalism or pragmatism of
the beholder.  All of which provides a fitting segue into the following
section of this Article.
III. A RACE TO THE TOP?
Recall that in his dissent from the refusal to grant en banc review
of the Amex III decision, Chief Judge Jacobs of the Second Circuit
worried that cost-based challenges asserting an inability to vindicate
statutory rights could subsume the rule of Concepcion.  The problem,
to Jacobs’s mind, is that vindication-of-rights challenges have no clear
limitation: they “can be used to challenge virtually every consumer
arbitration agreement that contains a class action waiver”148 given the
generally low per-plaintiff damages and the extraordinary expenses of
litigating most federal class actions.  In other words, in his view, “every
class counsel and every class representative who suffers small damages
[could] avoid arbitration by hiring a consultant (of which there is no
shortage) to opine that expert costs would outweigh a plaintiff’s indi-
vidual loss.”149
Earlier, I presented four possible responses to the concerns
underlying Judge Jacobs’ dissent.  In this Part, I will elaborate on each
of those basic positions and their interplay with the real world con-
tracting practices discussed above.
146 See, e.g., Sony Adds Mandatory Arbitration Clause to PSN ToS, GAMEPOLITICS.COM
(Sept. 15, 2011), http://gamepolitics.com/2011/09/15/sony-adds-mandatory-arbitra-
tion-clause-psn-tos; Matt Peckham, Sony’s ‘No-Sue’ PlayStation Network Use Clause is Anti-
Consumer, PCWORLD (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/240213/
sonys_nosue_playstation_network_use_clause_is_anticonsumer.html (reporting that
“in the wake of Sony’s catastrophic PSN security failure last April-May, the company’s
legal team seems to think the best way forward involves forcing consumers” to sign a
class action waiver).
147 Terms of Service and User Agreement, SONY ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK § 17 (Feb. 7,
2012), available at http://www.sonyentertainmentnetwork.com/terms-of-service/.
148 Amex IV, 681 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2012) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 144.
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A. FAA Absolutism
The FAA absolutist position holds that there is no vindication of
rights exception to arbitration agreements.  Even where the enforce-
ment of a bilateral arbitration clause can be shown in a particular case
to prevent the vindication of rights, the clause is per se enforceable
under the FAA.  And since the FAA is not dependent upon whether
claimants can adequately vindicate their rights in the arbitral forum,
there is no warrant for any inquiry into cost-allocation.  This view
unapologetically disowns the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated limitation
that arbitration agreements must be enforced as written under the
FAA “only so long as” they allow for the effective vindication of federal
rights.150
Of course, any reading of the FAA must deal with the saving
clause of Section 2, which provides that arbitration clauses are fully
enforceable, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”151  To avoid recognizing a vindication
of rights defense (or any equivalent defense, whether labeled as
“exculpatory contract” or otherwise) the FAA absolutist is forced to
take the position that such defenses do not constitute “grounds . . . for
the revocation of any contract.”  And this is a difficult argument to
make.152  As Justice Thomas recognized in his concurring opinion in
Concepcion, the defense of “exculpatory contract”—or the defense that
a contract insulates a defendant from effective challenge and prevents
the vindication of rights—is a long-established common law ground
150 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolf, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000); Vimar Segu-
ros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).  For those interested
in handicapping whether the current Supreme Court would turn its back on this line
of case law (presumably by derogating it all as “obiter dicta”), it is worth noting that
Vimar Seguros was authored by Justice Kennedy and contained an impassioned state-
ment that, if the arbitration clause at issue could be shown to prevent claimants from
vindicating their rights under a federal statute, it would be unenforceable under the
principles of Mitsubishi. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, 515 U.S. at 540.
151 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
152 Indeed, a number of federal courts have explicitly recognized the exculpatory
contract defense in the context of class action waivers in arbitration. See, e.g.,
Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We recognize
that there is a policy debate about whether class action waivers essentially act as excul-
patory clauses, allowing for violations of laws where individual cases involve low dollar
amounts and so will not adequately address or prevent illegality.”); Dale v. Comcast
Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Corporations should not be permitted
to use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability for small-
value claims.”).
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for the invalidation of contracts.153  Justice Thomas, however, would
distinguish between grounds for “invalidation” of contract (which
would include all common law contract defenses, whether rooted in
public policy concerns or otherwise) and “revocation” (which in his
view includes only defenses that go to the formation of the agreement,
such as duress and fraudulent inducement, and excludes all policy
based defenses, such as exculpatory contract).154
This revocation/invalidation distinction probably strikes most
observers as odd and ill-supported.  Certainly, no other Justice joined
in this view.  But the important point here is that the distinction is
absolutely necessary to any rejection of a vindication of rights defense
to arbitration agreements.  Once one recognizes that the vindication
of rights defense (or “exculpatory contract” defense) is a traditional
“ground at law or equity” for defending against the enforcement of
contracts, one is forced to slice the atom along the lines suggested by
Justice Thomas in order to read the FAA as precluding a vindication
of rights defense.155  And of course, in this absolutist view, the content
of arbitration agreements—including the extent to which they con-
tain consumer-friendly provisions ostensibly permitting the vindica-
tion of rights—is utterly immaterial.
B. Practical Formalism
A very different view is what I have termed “practical formalism.”
This view does not reject as a doctrinal matter the limitation of Mitsub-
ishi and other cases that arbitration agreements are enforceable only
so long as they allow for the effective vindication of rights.  But it con-
strues that limitation in a narrow and literal way.  It is not enough for
the practical formalist if the arbitration clause at issue would tend to
deter litigants and lawyers from seeking to vindicate federal rights.
The clause must prevent the vindication of rights.
Where an arbitration clause prevents the vindication of rights by
forcing a claimant to incur prohibitive costs, this view holds that an
153 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1755 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).  Justice Thomas alone interpreted section 2 of the FAA to bar all public policy-
based defenses to arbitration contracts, asserting that “[c]ontract defenses unrelated
to the making of the agreement—such as public policy— could not be the basis for
declining to enforce an arbitration clause.” Id. (emphasis added).
154 Id. at 1754.
155 Id. at 1756 (“Exculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic example of contracts
that will not be enforced because of public policy. . . .  [But r]efusal to enforce a
contract for public-policy reasons does not concern whether the contract was properly
made.” (citing 15 G. GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 85.1, 85.17, 85.18 (rev. ed.
2003))).
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agreement by the defendant to absorb the otherwise prohibitive costs
incurred by a prevailing plaintiff will cure the defect and render the
clause enforceable.  I call this view “formalist” in the sense that it
rejects the liberal pragmatic objection that, even with fee-shifting and
cost-shifting, claimants in the real world will be deterred from advanc-
ing costs and vindicating their rights.  And yet, it remains “practical”
insofar as it is rooted in the case-by-case test of Green Tree, which asks if
the claimant in practice can prove it will be saddled with such costs as
to prevent the vindication of rights.  In the practical formalist view,
chilling effects are beside the point; this view draws a far brighter line
based upon whether the plaintiff could vindicate its rights.
The prevalence of this view among corporate counsel (whether
explicit or intuited) would explain the proliferation of “consumer
friendly” provisions in arbitration agreements discussed above in Part
II.  To establish that plaintiffs could (in the narrow formal sense) vin-
dicate their rights, companies understandably want their agreements
to allow prevailing parties to recoup all costs and fees, to make some
allowance for the advancement of certain costs, and so forth.  (Judg-
ing from the agreements we reviewed, the provision of Concepcion style
bounty or premiums is still regarded as a luxury—an extra insurance
policy not necessary to get over the formal “could vindicate”
threshold.)
The predictable response from liberal quarters to the advent of
these consumer friendly clauses is largely derisive.  To the liberal prag-
matist, the consumer friendly clauses are a mere fig leaf, designed to
support the argument that consumer arbitration clauses allow for the
effective vindication of rights.156  By contrast, the practical formalist
approach—which I think is the dominant current in the legal commu-
nity—has no such cynicism.  It takes seriously the efforts of companies
to provide a framework that allows for the vindication of rights—at
least in the formal sense that the plaintiff could vindicate its rights.
To the practical formalist, the question of whether a plaintiff can
vindicate her rights will generally turn on whether the arbitration
clause would force the plaintiff to shoulder non-recoupable costs that
exceed the value of the relief sought, as distinct from statutorily
156 See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra  note 3, at 644 (arguing that “whatever the
merits of Justice Scalia’s view that [AT&T’s] bounty clause preserved the Concep-
cions’ ability to vindicate their rights, it is highly likely that this dictum . . . will prove
irresistible to lower courts faced with vindication-of-rights challenges in cases that fea-
ture a bounty clause”); id. at 646 (“Nor should anyone expect that consumers will
actually go forward with one-on-one arbitrations, even as consumer arbitration clauses
are liberalized to provide ostensible incentives to initiate proceedings in a bid to avoid
legal challenges.”).
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recoupable costs.  If the arbitration clause itself would saddle the
plaintiff with, say, $2,000 in non-recoupable expenses where she is
seeking $1,000 in relief, then the arbitration clause prevents the vindi-
cation of rights.  It doesn’t just chill vindication; it prevents it by estab-
lishing a process under which the claimant will be a net loser even if
she wins the arbitration.  On the other hand—and here is where the
practical formalist and the liberal pragmatist are likely to part ways—if
the arbitration clause would force the claimant to incur $2,000 of fully
recoupable expenses in order obtain the same $1,000 in relief, the prac-
tical formalist might say that the plaintiff could vindicate her rights.  A
pragmatist might reject that assertion (arguing, for example, about
the rationality of advancing $2,000 to win $1,000), but the practical
formalist lays claim to a bright, administrable line.157
Notably, this practical formalist approach lends itself well to law
and economics based arguments that market forces will determine the
best equilibrium for contract drafters and adherents.  Companies will
make economic calculations as to whether it is in their interest, for
example, to commit themselves to absorb all non-recoupable costs or
whether they are better served by leaving themselves exposed to possi-
ble collective litigation in those rare cases where, for example,
extraordinary non-recoupable expert fees will be necessary to allow
for the effective vindication of rights.158  But in the majority of cases in
this post-Concepcion era, “consumer friendly” additions to arbitration
clauses will likely suggest that plaintiffs do indeed have the ability to
vindicate their rights and so cannot avail themselves of a vindication
of rights challenge.  And to the practical formalist, these develop-
ments are to be cheered as a sort of race to the top, as companies
157 The Second Circuit’s decisions in Amex I–III lend some force to the practical
formalist camp.  Recall that the Amex court repeatedly laid emphasis on the compari-
son between the non-recoupable expert costs and the amount the claimant had at
stake. Amex I, 554 F.3d 300, 317 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he trebling of a small individual
damages award is not going to pay for the expert fees [that] . . . will be necessary to
make an individual plaintiff’s case here . . . .”).  Further, the judges sensibly held that,
even if a single individual arbitration will cost less than a trial in federal district court,
“neither an individual arbitration, nor an individual litigation would make any eco-
nomic sense in light of the likelihood that expert fees far in excess of any likely indi-
vidual recovery would need to be expended in either action.” Id. at 319 n.14.
158 In other words, a company may elect not to provide for the shifting of expert
witness fees, but where the enforcement of an arbitration clause and the concomitant
waiver of aggregate procedures would saddle the plaintiff with expert fees clearly in
excess of the recovery sought, the practical formalist will view that the company made
its bed, and the application of the vindication of rights defense will be appropriate.
But this is unlikely to arise very often.
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amend their dispute resolution clauses to permit the effective vindica-
tion of rights.
C. Liberal Pragmatism
As discussed above, the pragmatic objection to the dominant
strain of practical formalism is that it exalts form over substance to
give effect to these putatively consumer friendly provisions.  On planet
Earth, some of us would argue, no plaintiff in the position of the Con-
cepcions can be expected to advance thousands of dollars in a one-on-
one proceeding for the right to win $30.22, even if an arbitration vic-
tory that exceeds the defendant’s last and best offer would produce a
$7,500 bounty and double attorneys’ fees, and even if the entire outlay
were recoupable.159  Nor would any lawyer advance those costs, or her
time.160  The claims will simply go unaddressed, as evidence confirms.
For example, Professor Judith Resnick points out that between 2003
and 2007—a time period during which AT&T paid $1.3 billion to set-
tle manifold billing disputes with its 54 million cell phone subscrib-
ers161—only 170 consumers saw fit to access AT&T’s inexpensive
arbitration procedure (and that notwithstanding the unquestioned
159 See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]s the
Court of Appeals recognized, AT&T can avoid the [premium] payout (the payout that
supposedly makes the [plaintiffs’] arbitration worthwhile) simply by paying the
claim’s face value, such that ‘the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbi-
trating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22.’”) (quoting Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
584 F.3d 849, 855, 856 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011)).
160 See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 646 (“The main problem will be
attracting plaintiffs’ counsel: rational lawyers will be deterred by prohibitive disincen-
tives [and t]he availability of attorneys’ fees under fee-shifting statutes is not a realistic
inducement in consumer cases.”) (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concep-
cions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”) and
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Even if
[plaintiff] were willing to incur approximately $200,000 to recover a few thousand
dollars, she would be unable to retain an attorney to prosecute her individual
claim. . . . [Plaintiff’s counsel] will not prosecute her individual claim without charge,
and will not advance the required costs where the [arbitration] Agreement’s fee-shift-
ing provisions present little possibility of being made whole.”))).
161 Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers:  A Comment on AT&T v. Concep-
cion, Wal-mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 111 (2011)
(“[The] district court reported that AT&T paid $1.3 billion to settle billing problems
in 2007 by giving ‘manual credits to resolve customer concerns and complaints.’”
(citations omitted)).
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enforceability of the class waiver in most states during this period).162
Indeed, a number of courts have also remarked upon the reality that
consumers do not take advantage of dispute resolution procedures,
no matter how “consumer friendly,”163 because individually risking so
much for so little makes no sense.164
More important than costs are attorneys’ fees.  Class actions hap-
pen because lawyers advance their time and fees, and they are not
going to do that unless they can recover from sufficiently large num-
bers of people to make it worthwhile.  That is the truly pragmatic fact
162 Id. at 110 (citing Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
(No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3934621).
163 See, e.g., Stern v. AT&T Mobility Corp., No.  CV 05-8842 CAS (CTx), 2008 WL
4382796, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (comparing a version of the class action
waiver without the “bump-up” to a version with a “bump-up” and finding that “[t]he
likelihood that this new, limited provision would make it worthwhile for customers to
pursue individual claims is altogether improbable”); Stiener v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
556 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1030–31 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (explaining that a “bump-up” provi-
sion (i) does not make arbitration a “fair substitute for a class action,” (ii) offers
“incentives [that] are entirely illusory[,]” and (iii) provides “insufficient inducement
for individuals to pursue arbitration”).
164 For example, in Schnuerle v. Insight Communications Company, L.P., only one
plaintiff had ever filed an arbitration claim against the defendant based on the allega-
tions in the class complaint.  Nos. 2008–SC–000789–DG, 2009–SC–000390–DG, 2010
WL 5129850 (Ky. Dec. 16, 2010) (holding class action waiver unenforceable in case
where individual average claim is only $40 and where arbitration provision lacks any
consumer-friendly features).  Similarly, in Scott v. Cingular Wireless, the court noted
that no Washington consumers had taken the defendant to arbitration in the six years
prior to its ruling that the class action waiver was unconscionable. 161 P.3d 1000, 1007
(Wash. 2007).  And, in Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, the court found that “[t]he
cumulative real-world effect of the arbitration provisions in this case is that a con-
sumer’s minimum and maximum recovery from the title company are identical—
$0.00—for no consumer ever has filed an individual claim for arbitration against the
title company.”  364 S.W.3d 486, 487–88 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  See also Tracey &
McGill, supra note 82, at 445 n.43 (“Evidence in the record indicates that no arbitra-
tions have been brought under the clause that defendant has included in over 68,000
loan agreements in North Carolina. Based on this evidence and the above analysis, it
appears that the combination of the loser pays provision, the de novo appeal process,
and the prohibition on joinder of claims and class actions creates a barrier to pursu-
ing arbitration that is substantially greater than that present in the context of litiga-
tion. We agree with the trial court that ‘[d]efendant’s arbitration clause contains
features which would deter many consumers from seeking to vindicate their rights.”’)
(alteration in original) (quoting Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655
S.E.2d 362, 372 (N.C. 2008)).
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underpinning the vindication of consumer rights in our legal
system.165
What this really drives home is the difference between chilling
and preventing claims.  A liberal pragmatist isn’t convinced by the for-
malist argument that rights could be vindicated by an individual con-
sumer who might be motivated, for whatever idiosyncratic reason, to
wend his way through an individual arbitration.  The pragmatic point
is that rights will not in fact be vindicated if we ban collective action.  If
we are unmoved by the pragmatic fact that all claimants will be chilled
from pursuing claims—if that fact is legally non-cognizable— then the
pragmatist objection loses force.  And arguably, Justice Scalia’s major-
ity opinion in Concepcion established that this pragmatic objection is
indeed non-cognizable, by striking down the Discover Bank rule and
dismissing the dissent’s objection that “small dollar claims might oth-
erwise slip through the legal system.”166
D. Conservative Instrumentalism
The core of the conservative instrumentalist viewpoint here is the
concern that a vindication of rights defense will apply so broadly as to
invalidate most bilateral arbitration agreements in consumer cases,
and therefore—for instrumental reasons—should not be recognized.
Where state law claims are concerned, this critique may be dressed up
in quasi-constitutional garb by asserting that the allowance of the
defense will pose an “obstacle” to the institution of arbitration, and so
is preempted under the Supremacy Clause.  And indeed, some might
argue that this is the basis for the obstacle preemption holding in
Concepcion.
In any event, the practical formalist come-back to the view
espoused by Judge Jacobs and others appears powerful and persua-
sive.  So long as courts take seriously the question of whether consum-
ers could redress their rights under a particular arbitration clause,
and so long as they give weight to the consumer-friendly features of
those clauses which are proliferating as we go to print, the instrumen-
talist concern loses its steam.  It turns out that the exception will not
165 See supra text accompanying notes 51–71 (discussing risk aversion of attorneys,
who will be disinclined to take on individual arbitration).
166 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005) (“The potential for millions of customers to be
overcharged small amounts without an effective method of redress cannot be
ignored. Therefore, the provision violates fundamental notions of fairness. . . . This is
not only substantively unconscionable, it violates public policy by granting Discover a
‘get out of jail free’ card while compromising important consumer rights.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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swallow the rule.  It turns out that a traditional vindication of rights
defense is not an obstacle to the intent of Congress in passing the
FAA.  But none of that should cause conservatives to lose much sleep.
They are killing us with kindness.
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